Alim Urmancheev v. Hunter Anglea

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 29 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ALIM URMANCHEEV, No. 22-15701 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00791-DAD-BAK v. MEMORANDUM* HUNTER; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 26, 2024** Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges. Former California state prisoner Alim Urmancheev appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging access-to- courts and deprivation of property claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Urmancheev’s access-to-courts claim because Urmancheev failed to show actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (explaining that an access-to- courts claim requires a plaintiff to show that defendants’ conduct caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415-17 (2002) (to plead an actual injury for an access-to-courts claim, the complaint “should state the underlying claim . . . just as if it were being independently pursued”). The district court properly dismissed Urmancheev’s deprivation of property claim because Urmancheev failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a meaningful post-deprivation remedy was unavailable to him. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984) (a deprivation of property, whether random or intentional, is not actionable if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”). 2 22-15701  We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 3 22-15701