Section 362 | CALCRIM (Jury Instructions)

subsequently held that such language is not required. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54
Cal.3d 612, 672, fn. 9 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].)
RELATED ISSUES
Evidence
The false nature of the defendant’s statement may be shown by inconsistencies in
the defendant’s own testimony, his or her pretrial statements, or by any other
prosecution evidence. (People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498 [244 Cal.Rptr.
148, 749 P.2d 803] [overruling line of cases that required falsity to be demonstrated
only by defendant’s own testimony or statements]; accord People v. Edwards (1992)
8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1103 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 821]; People v. Williams (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 467, 478–479 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 358].)
Un-Mirandized Voluntary Statement
The Miranda rule (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444, 479 [86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]) does not prohibit instructing the jury that it may draw an
inference of guilt from a willfully false or deliberately misleading un-Mirandized
statement that the defendant voluntarily introduces into evidence on direct
examination. (People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166–1169 [94
Cal.Rptr.2d 727].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 111.
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 641.
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83,
Evidence, § 83.13[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][c]
(Matthew Bender).
363–369.
Reserved for Future Use
CALCRIM No. 362
EVIDENCE
138

Voluntary intoxication may not be considered for general intent crimes. (People v.
Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1127–1128 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735];
People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 81 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 18 P.3d 660]; see
also People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 451 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]
[applying specific vs. general intent analysis and holding that assault type crimes are
general intent; subsequently superseded by amendments to former Penal Code
Section 22 [now Penal Code section 29.4] on a different point].)
If both specific and general intent crimes are charged, the court must specify the
general intent crimes in the bracketed portion of the last sentence and instruct the
jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to those crimes. (People v. Aguirre
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 391, 399–402 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 48]; People v. Rivera (1984)
162 Cal.App.3d 141, 145–146 [207 Cal.Rptr. 756].)
If the defendant claims unconsciousness due to involuntary intoxication as a defense
to driving under the influence, see People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297,
1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167].
The court may need to modify this instruction if given with CALCRIM No. 362,
Consciousness of Guilt. (People v. Wiidanen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 526, 528, 533
[135 Cal.Rptr.3d 736].)
Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible on the question of whether a
defendant believed it necessary to act in self-defense. (People v. Soto