Section 3471 | CALCRIM (Jury Instructions)

v. Rodriguez disagreed, however, and found that an imperfect self-defense
instruction was not required sua sponte on the facts of the case where defendant’s
version of the crime “could only lead to an acquittal based on justifiable homicide,”
and when the prosecutor’s version could only lead to a conviction of first degree
murder. (People v. Rodriguez (1992) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1275 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d
345]; see also People v. Williams (1997) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441,
841 P.2d 961] [in rape prosecution, no mistake-of-fact instruction was required when
two sides gave wholly divergent accounts with no middle ground to support a
mistake-of-fact instruction].)
No Defense for Initial Aggressor
An aggressor whose victim fights back in self-defense may not invoke the doctrine
of self-defense against the victim’s legally justified acts. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574].) If the aggressor attempts
to break off the fight and communicates this to the victim, but the victim continues
to attack, the aggressor may use self-defense against the victim to the same extent
as if he or she had not been the initial aggressor. (Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 3; People
v. Trevino (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 874, 879 [246 Cal.Rptr. 357]; see CALCRIM No.
3471, Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor.) In addition, if the
victim responds with a sudden escalation of force, the aggressor may legally defend
against the use of force. (People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 301–302 [10
Cal.Rptr.3d 196]; see CALCRIM No. 3471, Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat
or Initial Aggressor.)
Transferred Intent Applies
“[T]he doctrine of self-defense is available to insulate one from criminal
responsibility where his act, justifiably in self-defense, inadvertently results in the
injury of an innocent bystander.” (People v. Mathews (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018,
1024 [154 Cal.Rptr. 628]; see also People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337,
1357 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 304].) There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on this principle,
although such an instruction must be given on request when substantial evidence
supports it. (People v. Mathews, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 1025; see also
CALCRIM No. 562, Transferred Intent.)
Definition of “Imminent”
In People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1187, overruled on other grounds in
People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1089, the jury requested clarification of
the term “imminent.” In response, the trial court instructed:
“Imminent peril,” as used in these instructions, means that the peril must have
existed or appeared to the defendant to have existed at the very time the fatal
shot was fired. In other words, the peril must appear to the defendant as
immediate and present and not prospective or even in the near future. An
imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.
(Ibid.)
HOMICIDE
CALCRIM No. 505
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