Section 1193 | CALCRIM (Jury Instructions)

(iv)
Evidence
850. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects:
Credibility of Complaining Witness
You have heard testimony from
<insert name of expert>
regarding the effect of (battered women’s syndrome/intimate partner
battering/
<insert other description used by expert for
syndrome>).
(Battered women’s syndrome/Intimate partner battering and its effects/
<insert other description used by expert for syndrome>) relate
to a pattern of behavior that may be present in domestic abuse cases.
Testimony as to (battered women’s syndrome/the effects of intimate
partner battering/
<insert other description used by expert for
syndrome>) is offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged
victim of domestic abuse.
’s <insert name of expert> testimony about (battered
women’s syndrome/intimate partner battering/
<insert other
description used by expert for syndrome>) is not evidence that the
defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or
any conduct or crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged].
You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
’s <insert name of alleged victim of abuse> conduct was
consistent with the conduct of someone who has been abused and in
evaluating the believability of (his/her) testimony.
New January 2006; Revised March 2017, April 2020, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Several courts of review have concluded there is no sua sponte duty to give a
similar limiting instruction (see CALCRIM No. 1193, Testimony on Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome) when an expert testifies on child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome. (People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063,
1073–1074 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 248]; People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721,
736 [256 Cal.Rptr. 446] and People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [261
Cal.Rptr. 479] [instruction required only on request].) See also People v. Humphrey
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5, 1090–1091, 1100 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d
1], which concludes that a limiting instruction on battered woman syndrome is
required only on request. But see People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947,
958–959 [9 Cal.Rtpr.2d 431], which did find a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM
No. 1193.
569

COMMENTARY
The jurors must understand that the research on child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome assumes a molestation occurred and seeks to describe and explain
children’s common reactions to the experience. (People v. Bowker, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d at p. 394.) However, it is unnecessary and potentially misleading to
instruct that the expert testimony assumes that a molestation has in fact occurred.
(See People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1387 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660].)
The prosecution must identify the myth or misconception the evidence is designed
to rebut (People v. Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394; People v. Sanchez,
supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 735; People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439,
449–450 [271 Cal.Rptr. 653]),