Section 1111 | CALCRIM (Jury Instructions)

Cal.Rptr. 221]; People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126
Cal.Rptr.2d 416].
•
Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
•
Actual Arousal Not Required. People v. McCurdy (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502
[213 P. 59].
•
Any Touching of Child With Intent to Arouse. People v. Martinez (1995) 11
Cal.4th 434, 444, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving People
v. Wallace (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its
progeny]; see People v. Diaz (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49
Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].
•
Child Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Instigation. People v. Meacham
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586] [“constructive”
touching; approving Austin instruction]; People v. Austin (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d
110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
•
Fear Defined. People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 939–940 [26
Cal.Rptr.2d 567]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258,
872 P.2d 1183] [in context of rape].
•
Force Defined. People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr.
582]; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]; see
also People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891,
94 P.3d 1089] [discussing Cicero and Pitmon].
•
Lewd Defined. In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497
P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure]; see Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979)
25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257, fn. 13 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
COMMENTARY
The instruction includes definitions of “force” and “fear” because those terms have
meanings in the context of the crime of lewd acts by force that are technical and
may not be readily apparent to jurors. (People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38,
52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [force]; see People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927,
939–940 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [fear]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847,
856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].) The
definition of “force” as used in Penal Code section 288(b)(1) is different from the
meaning of “force” as used in other sex offense statutes. (People v. Cicero (1984)
157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].) In other sex offense statutes, such as
Penal Code section 261 defining rape, “force” does not have a technical meaning
and there is no requirement to define the term. (People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].) In Penal Code section
288(b)(1), on the other hand, “force” means force “substantially different from or
substantially greater than” the physical force normally inherent in the sexual act.
(Id. at p. 1018 [quoting People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204
Cal.Rptr. 582]] [emphasis in Griffın].) The court is required to instruct sua sponte
in this special definition of “force.” (People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p.
CALCRIM No. 1111
SEX OFFENSES
852