Section 1030 | CALCRIM (Jury Instructions)

[Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger,
hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable person to do [or submit
to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to].
When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all
the circumstances, including the age of the other person and (his/her)
relationship to the defendant.]
[Retribution is a form of payback or revenge.]
[Menace means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure
someone.]
[An act is accomplished by fear if the other person is actually and
reasonably afraid [or he or she is actually but unreasonably afraid and
the defendant knows of his or her fear and takes advantage of it].]
[The other person must be alive at the time of the act for the crime of
sodomy to occur.]
<Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent>
[The defendant is not guilty of forcible sodomy if (he/she) actually and
reasonably believed that the other person consented to the act. The
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person
consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2012, October 2021, March
2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction defining the elements of
sodomy. (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k); People v. Martinez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d
19, 24–26 [232 Cal.Rptr. 736]; People v. Moore (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1400, 1407
[260 Cal.Rptr. 134].)
The court should select the appropriate alternative in element 3 to instruct how the
sodomy was accomplished.
Sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the moment of the act. (People v.
Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175–1177 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; If
this is an issue in the case, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The other
person must be alive . . .”
Defenses—Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief in
consent if there is “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a
SEX OFFENSES
CALCRIM No. 1030
773

The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definition contained in Penal
Code section 261 (rape). (See People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14
[126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving forcible lewd acts].)
In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, the court held that the
statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261 and former
262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court did not
discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the Leal
opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”
The term “force” as used in the forcible sex offense statutes does not have a
specialized meaning and court is not required to define the term sua sponte. (People
v. Griffın (