Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus KIOBEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER LATE HUSBAND KIOBEL, ET AL. v. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 10–1491. Argued February 28, 2012—Reargued October 1, 2012— Decided April 17, 2013 Petitioners, Nigerian nationals residing in the United States, filed suit in federal court under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging that respond- ents—certain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations—aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria. The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. The District Court dismissed several of petitioners’ claims, but on interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the entire complaint, reasoning that the law of na- tions does not recognize corporate liability. This Court granted certi- orari, and ordered supplemental briefing on whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States. Held: The presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims un- der the ATS, and nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption. Pp. 3–14. (a) Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS is a juris- dictional statute that creates no causes of action. It permits federal courts to “recognize private claims [for a modest number of interna- tional law violations] under federal common law.” Sosa v. Alvarez- Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 732. In contending that a claim under the ATS does not reach conduct occurring in a foreign sovereign’s territo- 2 KIOBEL v. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. Syllabus ry, respondents rely on the presumption against extraterritorial ap- plication, which provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indica- tion of an extraterritorial application, it has none,” Morrison v. Na- tional Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. ___, ___. The presumption “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.” EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248. It is typically applied to discern whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct ap- plies abroad, see, e.g., id., at 246, but its underlying principles simi- larly constrain courts when considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS. Indeed, the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in this con- text, where the question is not what Congress has done but what courts may do. These foreign policy concerns are not diminished by the fact that Sosa limited federal courts to recognizing causes of ac- tion only for alleged violations of international law norms that are “ ‘specific, universal, and obligatory,” 542 U. S., at 732. Pp. 3–6. (b) The presumption is not rebutted by the text, history, or purpos- es of the ATS. Nothing in the ATS’s text evinces a clear indication of extraterritorial reach. Violations of the law of nations affecting aliens can occur either within or outside the United States. And gener- ic terms, like “any” in the phrase “any civil action,” do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Morrison, supra, at ___. Petitioners also rely on the common-law “transitory torts” doc- trine, but that doctrine is inapposite here; as the Court has ex- plained, “the only justification for allowing a party to recover when the cause of action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a well- founded belief that it was a cause of action in that place,” Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 479. The question under Sosa is not wheth- er a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action pro- vided by foreign or even international law. The question is instead whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under U. S. law to enforce a norm of international law. That question is not answered by the mere fact that the ATS mentions torts. The historical background against which the ATS was enacted also does not overcome the presumption. When the ATS was passed, “three principal offenses against the law of nations” had been identi- fied by Blackstone: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Sosa, supra, at 723, 724. Promi- nent contemporary examples of the first two offenses—immediately before and after passage of the ATS—provide no support for the proposition that Congress expected causes of action to be brought un- der the statute for violations of the law of nations occurring abroad. And although the offense of piracy normally occurs on the high seas, Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 Syllabus beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or any other country, applying U. S. law to pirates does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy consequences. A 1795 opinion of Attorney Gen- eral William Bradford regarding the conduct of U. S. citizens on both the high seas and a foreign shore is at best ambiguous about the ATS’s extraterritorial application; it does not suffice to counter the weighty concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritori- ality. Finally, there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforce- ment of international norms. Pp. 6–14. 621 F. 3d 111, affirmed. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concur- ring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 10–1491 _________________ ESTHER KIOBEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER LATE HUSBAND, DR. BARINEM KIOBEL, ET AL., PETI- TIONERS v. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [April 17, 2013] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the United States, filed suit in federal court against cer- tain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations. Petition- ers sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U. S. C. §1350, alleging that the corporations aided and abetted the Nige- rian Government in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria. The question presented is whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States. I Petitioners were r