Millbrook v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MILLBROOK v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 11–10362. Argued February 19, 2013—Decided March 27, 2013 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the Government’s sover- eign immunity from tort suits, but excepts from that waiver certain intentional torts, 28 U. S. C. §2680(h). Section §2680(h), in turn, con- tains a proviso that extends the waiver of immunity to claims for six intentional torts, including assault and battery, that are based on the “acts or omissions” of an “investigative or law enforcement officer” i.e., a federal officer “who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests.” Petitioner Millbrook, a federal prisoner, sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging, inter alia, assault and battery by correctional officers. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment, and the Third Circuit affirmed, hewing to its precedent that the “law enforcement proviso” applies only to tortious conduct that occurs during the course of exe- cuting a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. Held: The law enforcement proviso extends to law enforcement officers’ acts or omissions that arise within the scope of their employment, re- gardless of whether the officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. The proviso’s plain language supports this conclu- sion. On its face, the proviso applies where a claim arises out of one of six intentional torts and is related to the “acts or omissions” of an “investigative or law enforcement officer.” §2680(h). And by cross- referencing §1346(b), the proviso incorporates an additional require- ment that the “acts or omissions” occur while the officer is “acting within the scope of his office or employment.” §1346(b)(1). Nothing in §2680(h)’s text supports further limiting the proviso to conduct arising out of searches, seizures of evidence, or arrests. The FTCA’s only reference to those terms is in §2680(h)’s definition of “investiga- 2 MILLBROOK v. UNITED STATES Syllabus tive or law enforcement officer,” which focuses on the status of per- sons whose conduct may be actionable, not the types of activities that may give rise to a claim. This confirms that Congress intended im- munity determinations to depend on a federal officer’s legal author- ity, not on a particular exercise of that authority. Nor does the pro- viso indicate that a waiver of immunity requires the officer to be engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity. The text never uses those terms. Had Congress intended to further narrow the waiver’s scope, it could have used language to that effect. See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 227. Pp. 4−8. 477 Fed. Appx. 4, reversed and remanded. THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 11–10362 _________________ KIM MILLBROOK, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [March 27, 2013] JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Kim Millbrook, a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleges that correc- tional officers sexually assaulted and verbally threatened him while he was in their custody. Millbrook filed suit in Federal District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§1346(b), 2671–2680 (FTCA or Act), which waives the Government’s sovereign immunity from tort suits, including those based on certain intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers, §2680(h). The District Court dismissed Millbrook’s action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that, while the FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for certain intentional torts by law enforcement officers, it only does so when the tortious conduct occurs in the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. Petitioner contends that the FTCA’s waiver is not so limited. We agree and reverse the judg- ment of the Court of Appeals.1 —————— 1 Because no party defends the judgment, we appointed Jeffrey S. Bucholtz to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below. 568 U. S. ___ (2012). Amicus Bucholtz has ably 2 MILLBROOK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court I A The FTCA “was designed primarily to remove the sover- eign immunity of the United States from suits in tort.” Levin v. United States, 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Act gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal employee “acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1). This broad waiver of sovereign immunity is subject to a number of exceptions set forth in §2680. One such exception, relating to intentional torts, preserves the Government’s immunity from suit for “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” §2680(h). We have referred to §2680(h) as the “intentional tort exception.” Levin, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 1974, Congress carved out an exception to §2680(h)’s preservation of the United States’ sovereign immunity for intentional torts by adding a proviso covering claims that arise out of the wrongful conduct of law enforcement officers. See Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. 93–253, §2, 88 Stat. 50. Known as the “law enforcement proviso,” this provision extends the waiver of sovereign immunity to claims for six intentional torts, including assault and battery, that are based on the “acts or omissions of inves- tigative or law enforcement officers.” §2680(h). The pro- viso defines “ ‘investigative or law enforcement officer’ ” to mean “any officer of the United States who is empowered —————— discharged his assigned responsibilities, and the Court thanks him for his well-stated arguments. Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” Ibid. B On January 18, 2011, Millbrook filed suit against the United States under the FTCA, asserting claims of negli- gence, assault, and battery. In his complaint, Millbrook alleged that, on March 5, 2010, he was forced to per- form oral sex on a BOP correctional officer, while another officer held him in a choke hold and a third officer stood watch nearby. Millbrook claimed that the officers threat- ened to kill him if he did not comply with their demands. Millbrook alleged that he suffered physical injuries as a result of the incident and, accordingly, sought compensa- tory damages. The Government argued that the FTCA did not waive the Unite