Policy Text
Roll Call Training Bulletin
Produced by: Sgt Chris Prince
Prepared b y: Mark Scurria Brian Louie, Interim Chief of Police
Volume 51
July 20, 2017
30 Day Impound Tows per 14602.6
On June 21, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Brewster v. Beck holding that
the 30-day impound of a vehicle seized pursuant to Vehicle Code section 14602.6(a)(1) violated the
Fourth Amendment. The panel reversed the District Court’s dismissal of a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Los Angeles police officers violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights
when they impounded her vehicle for 30 days pursuant to California Vehicle Code section 14602.6(a)(1).
(http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/06/21/15-55479.pdf)
The Court initially observed that Section 14602.6(a)(1 ) of the California Vehicle Code authorized police
to seize a vehicle when the driver’s license has been suspended. “A vehicle so impounded shall be impounded for 30 days.” Within two business days of impoundment, the agency that seizes the vehicle
must notify the vehicle’s owner and provide an “opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the
validity of, or consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage.” Section 14602.6(a)(2), (b). The Court noted that the LAPD’s “Impound Policy” mirrored Section 14602.6.
The Court then turned its attention to its analysis of Brewster’s constitutional claim, namely that the 30-
day impound of her vehicle constituted a “seizure ” under the Fourth Amendment. The Court stated that
the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable s earches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A
seizure is a “meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [his] property.” Soldal v.
Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court commented that, “[a] seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions.” United States v. Hawkins, 249 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The Court observed that parties agreed that the LAPD could impound—and, therefore, seize—
Brewster’s vehicle pursuant to Section 14602.6(a)(1) under the community caretaking exception to the
Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing
the community caretaking exception). But this ex ception is available only to “impound vehicles that
jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” Id. The Court stated that the
exigency that justified the initial seizure of Brew ster’s vanished once her vehicle arrived in impound and
Brewster showed up with proof of ownership and a valid driver’s license. The Court stated that the
question it must consider was whether the Fourth Amendment required further authorization for the LAPD to hold the vehicle for 30 days.
In answering this question, the Court initially noted that, “[a]
seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment only to the extent that the government’s justification holds force. Thereafter, the government must cease the seizure or secure a new justification.”
The Court stated that there were no cases on point in the Ninth Circuit, but noted that Judge Henderson
of the Northern District of California had addressed the matter “in a thorough and well-reasoned
Roll Call Training Bulletin
Produced by: Sgt Chris Prince
Prepared b y: Mark Scurria Brian Louie, Interim Chief of Police
Volume 51
opinion,” which the Court found persuasive. See Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 72 F. Supp. 3d 997
(N.D. Cal. 2014).
The Court stated that, “[b]ecause a 30-day impound is a ‘meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in [his] property,’ Soldal, 506 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the Fourth Amendment is implicated w hen a vehicle is impounded under Section 14602.6(a).”
The Court remarked that the District Court found that such a seizure did not present a Fourth
Amendment problem because "the state has an important interest in . . . keeping unlicensed drivers from driving illegally." In dismissing this conclusion by the District Court, the Court observed that Fourth
Amendment was implicated by a delay in returning the property, whether the property was seized for a
criminal investigation, to protect the public, or to punish the individual. Sandoval, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 1004.
The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment did not become irrelevant once an initial seizure had run
its course. The Court noted that, “[a] seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment only to the extent that the government's justification holds force. Th ereafter, the government must cease the seizure or
secure a new justification. Appellees [t he LAPD] have provided no justification here.”
The Court disagreed with a Seventh Circuit decision