Police Department Policy

GGPDE_2020-20_Voluntariness_Statement_Or_Waive_2053734

Garden Grove PD

Policy Text
JACKIE LACEY DISTRICT ATTORNEY LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ONEMINUTE BRIEF COPYRIGHT © 2020 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. MAY BE REPRODUCED FOR NON -COMMERCIA L PROSECUTORIAL, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY . 1MB@da.lacounty.gov NUMBER : 2020-20 DATE : 06-18-20 BY: Devallis Rutledge TOPIC : Voluntariness: Statement ? Waiver ? ISSUE : What is the distinction between an involuntary statement , and an involuntary Miranda waiver ? When the same term is applied to two different concepts , there’s always a risk of analytical confusion. ● Long before Miranda, the US Supreme Court had held that to be admissible in evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, a defendant ’s incul patory statement must be voluntary. Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 297 US 278, 286. A statement is involuntary i f coerc ed by an official’s use of force , mistreatment , threats or prom ises of lenienc y. See 1MB 2010 -08, and examples cited. Invol untary statements are inadmiss ible in court for any purpose , Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 398, and their evidentiary “fruits” are also inadmissible . Harrison v. US (1968) 392 US 219, 222. ● Thirty years after Brown, the court ruled that to be admissible under the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self -incrimination , a defendant ’s statement obtained via police custodial interrogation must generally be preceded by a voluntary Miranda waiver . Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 444. A Miranda waiver is involuntary if “the accused was threatened , tricked or cajoled into a waiver ….” Miranda , supra, at 476. See 1MB 2020 - 17, and exa mples cited. Voluntary s tatements la cking Miranda comp liance are inadmissible in the prosecution case -in-chief, but may be use d for any other purpose , including impeac hment . Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 US 714, 722. Miranda non-compliance does not result in exclusion of evidentiary “fruits .” US v. Patane (2004) 542 US 630, 642. This information was current as of publication date. It is not intended as legal advice. It is recommended that rea ders check for subsequent developments, and consult legal advisors to ensure currency after publication. Local policies and procedures r egarding application should be observed. LADA ONE -MINUTE BRIEF NO. 20 20-20 PAGE 2 ● Miran da did not repla ce the du e process test of vol untariness of statements . Even after Miranda, “[T]he co urt has continued to measure confessions against the requirements of due process. ” Miller v. Fenton (1985) 474 US 104, 110. Nor doe s Miranda non-compliance render a statement involuntary under the due process test. Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 US 298, 318. When statement s are claimed to be involuntary , “the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than the Fi fth Amendment's [compelled] Self–Incrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases ….” Chavez v. Martinez (2003) 538 US 76 0, 773. Properly analyzed, issues of the vol untariness of statements and of Miranda waivers are two different issu es, each of which should b e separately considered under the principles pertaining to each ; how ever, it is not uncommon to see Miranda principles improper ly applied to due process analysis . See, e.g., People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, relying in part on Miranda non-compliance to find a statement involuntary, contr ary to the teachings of Elstad , Chavez , and cases holding that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary ’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fou rteenth Amendment ,” Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 US 157, 167 , and that non - compliance with Miranda procedure s “does not mean that the statements received have actually been coerced ….” Elstad, supra, at 310. ● The burden of provi ng volu ntariness o f eithe r a statement or a Miranda waiver is by a preponderance of evidence. Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 US 477, 486 (statement); Colorado v. Connelly, supra, at 168 ( Miranda waiver). BOTTOM LINE : The starting point for “volun tariness ” analysis i s determin ing whet her the issue relates to voluntariness of the statement itself, or to voluntar

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