GGPDE_2020-19_Vehicle_Weapons_Frisk_2053780

JACKIE LACEY DISTRICT ATTORNEY LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ONEMINUTE BRIEF COPYRIGHT © 2020 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. MAY BE REPRODUCED FOR NON -COMMERCI AL PROSECUTORIAL, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY . 1MB@da.lacounty.gov NUMBER : 2020-19 DATE : 05-28-20 BY: Devallis Rutledge TOPIC : Vehicle Weapons “Frisk” ISSUE : What justifies a lim ited officer -safety search of a vehicle for weapons? In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 US 1, the US Supreme Court held that a lawfully -detained suspect could be frisked for weapons (pat-down of outer clothing) if the offic er had a reasonable suspicion the person was arme d and dangerous. See 1MB 2006 -20. The same officer -safety considerations also allow a limited “frisk ” of a lawfully -stopped vehicle , based on the same standard: “[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a w eapon may be placed or hidden , is permissible if the police officer possesses a reaso nable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. ” Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 US 1032, 1049 (plain view of a hunting knife on the floorboard justified a search of areas, compartments and containers that could conceal a weapon ). “In a sense, Long autho rized the ‘frisk’ of an automobile for weapons .” Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 US 325, 332. ● The Long rule applies, even if one occu pant is secured in custody, if another occupant is suspected of being dangerous and might access suspected weapons in the vehicle. “Mich igan v. Long permits an officer to search a vehicl e’s pass enger compartment when he ha s reasonable suspicion tha t an individual, whether o r not the arrestee , is dangerous and might access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons. ” Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 US 332, 346-47. This information was current as of publication date. It is not intended as legal advice. It is recommended that readers check for subsequent developments, and consult legal advisors to ensure currency after publication . Loc al polic ies and procedures r egarding application should be observed. LADA ONE -MINUTE BRI EF NO. 2020-19 PAGE 2 ● “The rule a pplies even where a defe ndant is outside his c ar and nom inally under the control of law enforcement officers. ” People v. Bus h (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052 (vehicle frisk was justified by information from the dispat cher that the detainee ha d a record of convictions for being a felon in possession of concealed f irearms). ● After occupants of a lawfully -stopped vehicle have been ordered out (see 1MB 2013 - 19), an officer ’s plain -view observation through the car windows or open doors may justify a weapons frisk. People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 564 (handle of a Glock 9 was visibl y protruding fro m the map pouch , justifying a further weap ons search, which yielded another handgu n). ● A reliab le citizen ’s fresh complaint of threats or bran dishing by an occu pant of an identifiable vehi cle may also justif y a weapons frisk of the vehicle. People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463. ● However, a weapons frisk of a vehicle under Long may not be ju stified by simply assert ing that it was “standard p rocedu re” to fris k suspects and vehicles in gang a reas late at night. “A frisk for wea pons is not justified unless the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, considered in conjunction wi th rational infer ences to be drawn theref rom, give rise to a reasonable suspic ion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. … [T]ime and location of an encounter are insuffi cient by themselves to cast reasonable suspicion on an individua l.” People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.A pp.4th 171, 17 6-77. “We stress that our decision does not m ean that the police may conduct [weapons] searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop. … [O]fficers who conduct [safety] searches during investigative detentions must do so only when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry [reasonable suspicion of weapons and dan ger].” Michigan v. Long, supra, at 1049, fn. 14. Of course, searches may