Policy Text
JACKIE LACEY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
ONEMINUTE
BRIEF
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NUMBER : 2020-17 DATE : 05-14-20 BY: Devallis Rutledge TOPIC : Miranda Waiver Validity
ISSUE : What are the three requirements fo r a valid Miranda waiver?
Obtaining a fully -admissible statement from a suspect via custodial police interrogation
usually requires advice as to so -called “Miranda rights” (but see 1MB 2019 -14, discussing
four exceptions). “The defendan t may waive effect uation of these rights, provided the waiver
is made [1] voluntarily, [2] knowingly and [3] intelligentl y.” Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384
US 436, 444. What do these three separate requirements mean?
● “Voluntary .” “The voluntariness of a [Miranda] waiver … has always depended on
the absence of police overreaching ….” Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 US 157, 170.
“[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened , tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of
course, show that the accused did not voluntarily waive his privilege. ” Miranda, at 476.
• Therefore, a Miranda waiver is involuntary if coerced by police threats . People v.
Esqueda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1484 and fn. 20 (involuntary waiver where offi cers
threatened the suspect with greater charges and unrelenting interrogation to obtain a waiver).
• Waiver resulting from police tricks is involuntary. People v. Superior Court (Keithl ey)
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 406, 409 (falsely telling the suspect his finger print w as found at the crime
scene , before getting a waiver ). However, after a voluntary waiver is obtained, interrogators
may use plausible deception to obtain a voluntary statement . See 1MB 2007 -03.
• Use of pre -waiver “cajoling ” to get a waiver may make the waiver involuntary.
Peop le v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 161 ( “clever softening -up” by extensive pre-
advisement “ingratiati ng conversation ” with the suspect while denigrating the victim rendered
the subsequent waiver involuntary).
This information was current as of publication date. It is not intended as legal advice. It is
recommended that readers check for subsequent developments, and consult legal advisors to ensure
currency after publication. Local policies and procedure s regard ing application should be observed.
LADA ONE -MINUTE BRIEF NO. 20 20-17 PAGE 2
● “Knowing .” For a waiver to have been “knowingly ” made , “the waiver must have
been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned [‘silence
and counsel ’] and the conseque nces of the decision to abandon it [‘may be used against
you’].” Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 US 412, 421.
This requirement is routinely satisfied by reading the advisement of rights in a
language the suspect compre hends , asking whether he understands , and re porting or
recording the suspect ’s responses . Tague v. Louisiana (1980) 444 US 469 (waiver was
invalid where the officer testified that he could not recall whether he asked the suspect if he
understood his rights ).
● “Intelli gent .” An “intelligent ” waiver can only be obtained from a suspect who “has
the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights ,” taking into consideration the suspect’s
“age, experience, education, background, and intelligence .” Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 US
707, 725. Where a suspect is obviously of youthful age, limited education or low intelligenc e,
or is injured , ill, drunk or otherwise impaired , well-trained interrogators will ask a few baseline
questions to reveal the suspect ’s degree of lucidity and responsiveness . (“Where are we? ”
“What’s your date of birth? ” “Where did you go to school? ” etc.)
Cases have held that as long as the suspect ’s responses show that he understands his
situation , the fact of som e physical or intell ectual limitation does not necessarily make him
incapable of giving an intelligent waiver. People v. Jenkins (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1171
(IQ of 64; s evere cognitive disability) ; People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 248 (injured ;
hospi talized; mentally