Yolanda Cobb v. Nancy Berryhill

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 17 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT YOLANDA YVETTE COBB, No. 15-15316 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00888-BAM v. MEMORANDUM* NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted February 14, 2017** San Francisco, California Before: SILER***, TASHIMA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.  Yolanda Cobb appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 1. Social Security Ruling 13-2p, ¶ 7.b requires the agency to “have evidence in the case record that establishes that a claimant with a co-occurring mental disorder(s) would be disabled in the absence of [substance abuse].” Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that in the absence of substance abuse Cobb would no longer qualify as disabled. Dr. Vydro evaluated Cobb when she denied any substance abuse and had been staying at the hospital for a few days. During this evaluation, Dr. Vydro found her cooperative and pleasant. He also noted that she exhibited insight and judgment displaying intact cognitive functioning. Dr. Gaab, on the other hand, evaluated Cobb after she had abused prescription drugs. In his diagnosis, Dr. Gaab found Cobb’s cognitive functioning prevented her from working. The ALJ’s comparison of these evaluations provided substantial evidence in support of the determination that without substance abuse Cobb would no longer be disabled. See, e.g., Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”). 2. Phillips v. Commissioner of Social Security, 613 F. App’x 641, 642 (9th Cir. 2015), does not suggest a different result. In comparing the medical evaluations 2 of Drs. Vydro and Gabb, the ALJ considered whether Cobb would remain disabled if she limited her use of medications to the prescribed dosage because during her stay at the hospital—the backdrop of Dr. Vydro’s evaluation—Cobb’s medication use was limited to the dosage properly prescribed. AFFIRMED. 3