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No. 10013047
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Walleye Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. v. Silver Lake Group, L.L.C.
No. 10013047 · Decided July 24, 2024
No. 10013047·Ninth Circuit · 2024·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
July 24, 2024
Citation
No. 10013047
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: SILVER LAKE GROUP, LLC No. 23-15822
SECURITIES LITIGATION,
______________________________ D.C. No. 4:20-cv-
02341-JSW
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES
MASTER FUND LTD.; WALLEYE
MANAGER OPPORTUNITIES LLC, OPINION
Lead Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SILVER LAKE GROUP, L.L.C.; SLP
III INVESTMENT HOLDINGS S.A
R.L.; SILVER LAKE PARTNERS III,
L.P.; SILVER LAKE TECHNOLOGY
INVESTORS III, L.P.; SILVER
LAKE TECHNOLOGY
ASSOCIATES III, L.P.; SLTA III
(GP), L.L.C.; BC PARTNERS LLP;
SERAFINA S.A.; BC EUROPEAN
CAPITAL VIII; BC EUROPEAN
CAPITAL-INTELSAT CO-
INVESTMENT; BC EUROPEAN
CAPITAL-INTELSAT CO-
INVESTMENT 1; CIE
MANAGEMENT II LIMITED;
2 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
LMBO EUROPE SAS; RAYMOND
SVIDER; JUSTIN BATEMAN;
DAVID MCGLADE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 5, 2024
San Francisco, California
Filed July 24, 2024
Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., ANDREW D.
HURWITZ, and ANTHONY D. JOHNSTONE, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 3
SUMMARY*
Securities
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an
action under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.
Hedge funds Walleye Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.
and Walleye Manager Opportunities LLC sued large
shareholders of Intelsat S.A., alleging that the shareholders
acquired material non-public information surrounding a
meeting between Intelsat and the Federal Communications
Commission and that the shareholders relied upon this
information in insider trading during an after-hours block
sale of stock.
The panel held that Walleye had Article III standing to
sue because it sufficiently pleaded both injury and causation
by alleging that it bought Intelsat stock at a price inflated due
to defendants’ failure to disclose material information.
The panel held that Walleye had statutory standing under
Section 20A of the Exchange Act, which requires that
plaintiff-buyers trade “contemporaneously” with defendant-
sellers, even though Walleye traded on the public market and
did not buy the Intelsat shares sold during the after-hours
block trade.
The panel held, however, that Walleye failed adequately
to plead that the BC Partners defendants, the Silver Lake
defendants, and defendant David McGlade possessed
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
material non-public information. Walleye did not adequately
plead that Silver Lake knew about the meeting with the FCC
because it did not specifically allege the who, what, when,
where, or how Silver Lake learned of the meeting prior to
selling Intelsat shares. Walleye did not adequately plead that
BC Partners knew about the meeting prior to its trade
because Walleye did not allege with particularity any
communications between Intelsat and BC Partners. And for
similar reasons, Walleye did not adequately plead that
McGlade possessed material non-public information.
The panel held that Walleye also failed adequately to
plead that the alleged information that the defendants had
was material.
COUNSEL
Jake Bissell-Linsk (argued), David Saldamando, and Carol
C. Villegas, Labaton Keller Sucharow LLP, New York, New
York; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Gerson A. Zweifach (argued), Steven Farina, and Amanda
M. MacDonald, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington,
D.C.; Melanie Blunschi (argued), Nicholas Rosellini, and
Morgan E. Whitworth, Latham & Watkins LLP, San
Francisco, California; Christina R. Gay, Latham & Watkins
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Matthew Rawlinson, Latham &
Watkins LLP, Menlo Park, California; Evan L. Seite
(argued) and Nina F. Locker, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati, Palo Alto, California; Steffen N. Johnson and John
B. Kenney, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Washington,
D.C.; Miles F. Ehrlich and Katharine A. Kates, Ehrlich &
Craig, Berkeley, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 5
OPINION
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Hedge funds Walleye Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.
and Walleye Manager Opportunities LLC (collectively,
Walleye) sued three large shareholders of Intelsat S.A.
(Intelsat), a satellite communications company. They
alleged that the defendant shareholders—BC Partners, Silver
Lake, and David McGlade, chairman of Intelsat’s board1—
acquired material non-public information surrounding a
meeting between Intelsat and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) that the shareholders relied upon in
insider trading during an after-hours block sale of stock. The
shareholders separately moved to dismiss the complaint.
The district court granted the motions, holding that Walleye
failed to adequately plead both possession of material non-
public information and scienter. Walleye amended the
complaint, adding minimal allegations, but the district court
dismissed the operative second amended complaint (SAC)
on similar grounds. We affirm.
1
In its operative second amended complaint (SAC), Walleye sued
sixteen defendants. Reference to “BC Partners” in this opinion refers to
all the named “BC Partners” defendants represented on appeal, as
defined in the SAC, as well as individual defendants Raymond Svider
and Justin Bateman. Similarly, “Silver Lake” refers to any “Silver
Lake” defendants represented on appeal, as defined in the SAC.
6 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
A. Intelsat advocated for a market-based approach
to selling its C-Band license, which led to
increasing public opposition.
Intelsat is a satellite operator that provides broadcasting
services.2 To avoid service issues caused by multiple
broadcasts transmitting over a single frequency, the FCC
allocates licenses for use of individual frequencies. A
significant portion of Intelsat’s business involved its license
to use the frequency range known as the “C-Band,” which is
often used for television broadcasts.
By 2017, discussions began among interested parties
about options for “freeing up” the C-Band to aid in the
adoption of 5G technology. To avoid a financial catastrophe
from the possible loss of its C-Band license, Intelsat formed
the “C-Band Alliance” (CBA) with other satellite
broadcasters. The CBA proposed that its members
voluntarily vacate the C-Band and then auction the right to
use the vacated portion of the spectrum to cell phone service
providers. This proposal, a “private auction,” would
compensate CBA members for freeing up the C-Band with
the profits from the auction. It was assumed that such an
auction would yield more than $60 billion.
The FCC, however, traditionally used a “public auction”
to allocate spectrum bands. If the FCC were to sell C-Band
rights at a public auction, it would begin by revoking the
CBA members’ licenses and their rights in the C-Band. The
2
Unless otherwise noted, we recount the facts from the SAC and assume
them to be true. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007).
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 7
FCC would then auction the rights to new licensees to use
the C-Band with the federal government receiving the
auction proceeds. Without the benefit of proceeds from a
private auction of C-Band rights, Intelsat likely could not
service its debts and would eventually be compelled to file
for bankruptcy.
Whether the FCC would pursue a public or private
auction of the C-Band rights depended on the vote of FCC
Chairman Ajit Pai. According to a confidential witness, a
vice-president-level former employee of Intelsat
(Confidential Witness One), by the fall of 2019, the FCC
“had been giving Intelsat ‘all the right body language’ to
indicate it was likely to support” a private auction. Between
September and October of 2019, analysts at various
investment banking firms publicly opined that the FCC
appeared likely to permit the CBA to engage in a private
auction.
In late October of 2019, the tides began turning against a
private auction. Senator John Kennedy, a particularly vocal
opponent of a private auction, advocated to Chairman Pai
and President Trump for a public auction.3 In the House of
3
The statements in this paragraph come from news articles and a
congressional press release BC Partners attached to its motion to dismiss.
The district court took judicial notice of the existence of these documents
to establish public knowledge of legislation and statements opposing the
private auction. See In re Silverlake Grp., L.L.C. Secs. Litig., No. 20-cv-
02341, 2022 WL 4485815, at *3 & nn. 5–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2022).
Walleye does not oppose our consideration of these exhibits, and we
consider them as information “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed.
R. Evid. 201(b); see Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322 (noting that court may
consider judicially noticed documents in deciding a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) appeal); Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899
F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018).
8 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
Representatives, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced
a bill that would require a public auction. Reports in early
November confirmed that there was “mounting pressure
from both Republicans and Democrats” for the FCC to reject
the CBA’s public auction plan.
B. Intelsat and CBA representatives met with the
FCC on November 5, 2019.
On the evening of November 4, 2019, Intelsat and CBA
representatives requested a meeting with FCC staff for the
next morning. Public records show that meetings between
the CBA and FCC had occurred more than 50 times between
2018 and 2019.4 A meeting was scheduled at the FCC
offices in Washington, D.C. at 9:00 AM on November 5,
2019. Intelsat CEO Spengler, Stephen Collar, the CEO of
SES (another major member of the CBA), other CBA
representatives, and Nicholas Degani, senior counsel to
Chairman Pai, attended the meeting. Prior to the meeting,
Degani emailed Chairman Pai and said, “so . . . given where
we are, I assume I’d play it cold, no?” Chairman Pai agreed.
What occurred at the meeting is not entirely clear.
Confidential Witness One, who was not in attendance, said
that “he was informed, just after the meeting, that the
meeting had ‘confirmed the rumors that the FCC was leaning
toward going with Senator Kennedy’s approach,’ but that
‘the fight was not over,’ because it may still be possible to
win them over.” Confidential Witness Two, a senior
executive at the CBA, also did not attend the meeting but
4
We take judicial notice of this document, which is publicly available
on the FCC website, for the proposition that the information available to
the public included regular FCC-Intelsat meetings. See Tellabs, 551 U.S.
at 322; Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999.
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 9
heard that the “meeting had gone poorly and that the
messaging from the FCC was negative.”
SES CEO Collar, testifying at a subsequent bankruptcy
trial,5 stated that the meeting departed from the usual course
of meetings between CBA and the FCC. Collar testified
that:
We’d been engaged [for more than eighteen
months] with the FCC. We’d had a number
of meetings with Nick Degani, who was kind
of running the process, I would say. . . . And
normally what happened in meetings with
Nick Degani is he would pretty much tell us
how it was. So he would explain the position
of the chairman. He would explain how we
should think about things. He would tell us –
you know, give us direction. In this meeting,
he didn’t. He was very – very quiet. He
responded only to a handful of questions.
And he gave us reason to believe that the plan
we had, which was for a – a private auction,
would – was at risk.
Collar continued that, after the meeting, the attendees “all
formed slightly different impressions” about how they
believed the FCC process would unfold. “[O]ne
interpretation of what [Degani] said was that” the White
5
We may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference.” Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322. A complaint incorporates a
document by reference “‘if the plaintiff refers extensively to the
document.’” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002 (quoting United States v. Ritchie,
342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003)). Walleye extensively quotes
bankruptcy testimony throughout the SAC. See id.
10 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
House did not support a private auction and that CBA was
“running into political objection.”
Spengler testified at the bankruptcy trial that the
attendees “didn’t know” whether “the tide seemed to be
turning,” but that the tone of the meeting was different than
prior meetings. Spengler confirmed that Degani was “tight-
lipped” at the meeting and “[d]idn’t respond clearly to []
questions.” Although he was worried that the FCC was
going to reject a private auction approach, “it was not
definitive in [Spengler’s] mind.” He viewed Degani as
offering “virtually no feedback on any of the points [the
CBA] made” and no “additional information as to where the
FCC stood in their process.”
After the meeting, the attendees returned to a hotel,
where they engaged in “a lot of discussion” in order “to
figure out how much trouble [they] were in,” and whether
Degani was trying to send a message to them that they did
not have political support for a deal.
C. Intelsat’s biggest investors sold shares after the
market closed on November 5, 2019.
Intelsat’s largest shareholders at the time of the meeting
included two private equity firms: BC Partners, which
owned about 41% of Intelsat, and Silver Lake, which owned
about 9%. BC Partners was represented on the board of
directors, but Silver Lake was not.
After the markets closed on November 5, 2019, Morgan
Stanley brokered a private block trade of Intelsat stock on
behalf of BC Partners, Silver Lake, and McGlade, chairman
of Intelsat’s board. BC Partners initiated the trade, while
Silver Lake and McGlade exercised their “tag-along” rights
to participate in any equity sale initiated by BC Partners.
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 11
The selling group offered 10 million shares (about 14% of
the group’s holdings) at $24.60 per share, a 6.6% discount to
the market closing price. Interested buyers had an hour to
decide whether to accept the offer. Walleye does not allege
that it purchased any shares in the block sale.
In subsequent bankruptcy testimony, Intelsat’s general
counsel testified that “BC Partners had been planning [its]
trade before the November 5 Meeting.” In re Intelsat S.A.,
No. 20-bk-32299, at *27–28 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 30,
2021), Dkt. 3662. She recounted conversations with
employees of BC Partners on November 1 and 4 about the
firm’s “intention to trade” “once the trading window opened
after [Intelsat’s] quarterly earnings release” on October 29,
2019.6
D. Intelsat’s stock collapsed.
On November 8, 2019, the FCC publicly disclosed that
its staff met with the CBA on November 5 and that the CBA
submitted an amended proposal to the FCC in response to a
request to clear more spectrum. Intelsat’s stock price
promptly dropped by 1.85%. The next week, the CBA filed
a document with the FCC reiterating its proposal to make a
significant monetary contribution to the U.S. Treasury if the
FCC accepted its private auction proposal. During this time,
industry analysts reported on the “decreased likelihood of
the C-Band getting a clear win from the FCC” due to
mounting political pressure.
On November 18, 2019, Chairman Pai announced that
he would vote in favor of a public auction. Intelsat’s stock
closed around 40% below the price of the prior day, a 70%
6
BC Partners could not trade prior to the earnings announcement.
12 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
decline from November 5, 2019. It fell an additional 24.16%
the following day.
On February 28, 2020, the FCC formally voted 3-2 for a
public auction. Several months later, Intelsat filed for
bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy proceedings, a special
litigation committee concluded, after investigating potential
securities fraud claims, that there was no evidence to
substantiate insider trading claims against BC Partners,
Silver Lake, or McGlade. In re Intelsat S.A., No. 20-bk-
32299, at *40 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 7, 2021), Dkt. 3757.
II. Procedural Background
The complaint in this putative securities class action was
filed on April 7, 2020. On December 1, 2020, the district
court appointed Walleye as lead plaintiff pursuant to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 2005 (PSLRA),
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B). Walleye filed a first amended
complaint on January 14, 2021, asserting claims under
Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a), 78t-1
(the Exchange Act) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 promulgated under the
Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
The district court granted the motions to dismiss the
amended complaint of Silver Lake, BC Partners, and
McGlade, holding that Walleye failed to plead particularized
facts showing that the defendants were aware of material,
non-public information regarding the C-Band auction at the
time of their after-hours block trade. In re Silverlake, 2022
WL 4485815, at *9–10. The district court also held that
Walleye failed to allege sufficient facts showing defendants
acted with scienter, noting that the timing of the block sale
followed Intelsat’s earnings announcement for third-quarter
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 13
2019, after a selling ban lifted, during a period of intense
political opposition to the private auction proposal. Id. The
district court, however, rejected defendants’ arguments that
Walleye lacked statutory standing to pursue its claims. Id.
at *5–6.
Walleye then filed the operative SAC, adding allegations
from a third confidential witness, additional testimony from
Intelsat’s bankruptcy proceedings about the November 5,
2019, meeting, and information about Intelsat’s board
meeting on November 14, 2019. The defendants again each
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the district
court granted those motions. Walleye timely appealed.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Prodanova v. H.C.
Wainwright & Co., LLC, 993 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir.
2021).
ANALYSIS
I. Walleye has standing to sue.
A. Article III Standing
When lack of standing is raised in a motion to dismiss,
we “accept as true all material allegations of the complaint
and construe the complaint in favor of the complaining
party.” Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up). To have constitutional standing, “a plaintiff
must demonstrate (i) that she has suffered or likely will
suffer an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused
or will be caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury
14 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief.”
Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.
367, 380 (2024). “For standing purposes, . . . an important
difference exists between (i) a plaintiff’s statutory cause of
action to sue a defendant over the defendant’s violation of
federal law, and (ii) a plaintiff’s suffering concrete harm
because of the defendant’s violation of federal law.”
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426–27 (2021).
Only a plaintiff who has “been concretely harmed by a
defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private
defendant over that violation in federal court.” Id. at 427
(emphasis removed).
We conclude that Walleye sufficiently pleaded both
injury and causation. Assuming the allegations in the
complaint are true (and constitute insider trading), Walleye
bought Intelsat stock at a price inflated because of the
defendants’ failure to disclose material information. One
trading while in possession of material, non-public
information has a duty to publicly disclose that information.
See McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., Inc., 26 F.3d 869, 876
(9th Cir. 1994). Others who trade on the security without
that information are harmed because they operate at a
disadvantage, unknowingly trading a security at a price that
does not reflect all information available. See United States
v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997); see also Shapiro
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[O]ur ‘disclose or abstain’ rule
enunciated in Texas Gulf ‘applies whether the securities are
traded on a public stock exchange or sold through private
placement.’” (quoting Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v.
Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972)). If the
allegations in the SAC constitute insider trading, Walleye
was “concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 15
violation” and has Article III standing to bring its insider
trading claims. TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 427 (emphasis
removed).
B. Statutory Standing
BC Partners and McGlade also claim that Walleye lacks
statutory standing under Section 20A of the Exchange Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a). They argue that Walleye does not
meet the statutory requirement that plaintiff-buyers trade
“contemporaneously” with defendant-sellers because
Walleye traded on the public market and did not buy the
shares of Intelsat stock sold during the after-hours private
block trade.7 We disagree.
Section 20A provides that “[a]ny person who . . . sell[s]
a security while in possession of material, nonpublic
information shall be liable in an action in any court of
competition jurisdiction to any person who,
contemporaneously with the . . . sale of securities that is the
subject of such violation, has purchased . . . securities of the
same class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (emphasis added). The
word “contemporaneous” denotes a temporal proximity and
means “existing, occurring, or originating during the same
time.” Contemporaneous, Merriam-Webster.com
Dictionary Online (2024); Turocy v. El Pollo Loco Holdings,
Inc., No. 8:15-cv-01343, 2018 WL 3343493, at *14 (C.D.
7
Because we addressed statutory standing as a “threshold issue” in East
Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, we also do so here. 932 F.3d 742,
763 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We likewise must determine whether a plaintiff’s
claim falls within the statute’s zone of interests before we can consider
the merits of the claim.”). As we acknowledged, however, the “zone of
interests inquiry is not jurisdictional.” Id. at 762 n.5; Lexmark Int’l, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014).
16 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
Cal. July 3, 2013).8 Appellees sold securities on November
5, 2019. On November 5 and 6, 2019, Walleye “purchased
. . . securities of the same class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a). Thus,
Walleye traded “contemporaneously” in “securities of the
same class” with BC Partners, Silver Lake, and McGlade.
BC Partners and McGlade nonetheless argue that
because the block sale occurred after-hours on a private-
market basis, Walleye’s public-market trade was not
“contemporaneous.” In other words, they ask us to hold that
Section 20A, although silent on the issue, requires
contractual privity. They cite several cases that describe the
purpose of the contemporaneous trade rule as weeding out
plaintiffs who could not have possibly traded with the
insider. See, e.g., Brody v. Transitional Hosps. Corp., 280
F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2002); Neubronner v. Milken, 6
F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1993); Wilson v. Comtech Telecom.
Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Any duty of
disclosure is owed only to those investors trading
contemporaneously with the insider; non-contemporaneous
traders do not require the protection of the ‘disclose or
abstain’ rule because they do not suffer the disadvantage of
trading with someone who has superior access to
information.”).
These cases, however, address a different issue than the
one BC Partners and McGlade pose. They ask what length
of time (e.g., days, weeks, or months) between transactions
constitutes “contemporaneous” trading. Brody, 280 F.3d at
1002; Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 670; Wilson, 648 F.2d at 94–
8
Because the parties do not dispute whether trading must have occurred
on the same day to be “contemporaneous,” we do not decide the issue.
We also assume that any trades on November 5 took place after
Appellees sold their securities.
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 17
95. None of these cases holds that trades must occur in the
same market to be “contemporaneous.” Instead, they use a
purpose behind the contemporaneous trading requirement—
weeding out individuals who could not have possibly traded
with the sellers—to define its temporal scope. As the district
court correctly noted, the contemporaneous trading rule is “a
proxy for contractual privity.” In re Silverlake, 2022 WL
4485815 at *6.
In Shapiro, the Second Circuit noted that the “disclose or
abstain” rule (i.e., prohibition on insider trading):
applies whether the securities are traded on
a public stock exchange or sold through
private placement. To hold that Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 impose a duty to
disclose material inside information only in
face-to-face transactions or to the actual
purchasers or sellers on an anonymous
public stock exchange, would be to frustrate
a major purpose of the antifraud provisions
of the securities laws: to insure (sic) the
integrity and efficiency of the securities
markets.
495 F.2d at 237 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Congress’s
citation to Shapiro in the relevant legislative history
underscores that it did not intend to limit liability to
transactions with direct privity. H.R. Rep. No. 100-910, at
27 n.22 (1988). Although the contemporaneous trading rule
acts as a stand-in for privity, it merely requires that the seller
and buyer engaged in transactions close in time, not with
each other. We therefore conclude that Walleye has
statutory standing to sue.
18 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
II. Walleye did not adequately plead that BC Partners,
Silver Lake, and McGlade possessed material non-
public information.9
“To recover damages for violations of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) a
material . . . omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the . . . omission and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the . . . omission;
(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.’” Halliburton Co.
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 267 (2014)
(quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568
U.S. 455, 460–61 (2013)). In the insider trading context, a
plaintiff must show that a defendant purchased or sold
securities while possessing material, non-public
information, and that the defendant acted with scienter.10
See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1063–64, 68 (9th
Cir. 1998).
Insider trading actions “must meet the higher, exacting
pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
and the . . . PSLRA.” See Or. Pub. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Apollo
Grp. Inc., 774 F.3d 598, 604 (9th Cir. 2014). Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that “[i]n alleging fraud or
9
Appellees argue that Walleye waived its argument regarding the
possession of material, non-public information by not addressing it in its
opening brief. Although Walleye did not frame its argument as
addressing a separate element, it made several arguments that Appellees
possessed material non-public information. We thus conclude that it did
not waive the argument.
10
McGlade contends that Walleye must show that the traders “used”
material, nonpublic information. Because we hold that the district court
properly found that Walleye did not plead possession or awareness of
material, non-public information, we do not reach this issue or the issue
of scienter.
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 19
mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Id. “A
pleading is sufficient under Rule 9(b) if it identifies the
circumstances constituting fraud,” including “such facts as
the times, dates, places, benefits received, and other details
of the alleged fraudulent activity,” so that the “defendant can
prepare an adequate answer from the allegations.”
Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 671–72 (cleaned up).
Under the PSLRA, securities plaintiffs must “state with
particularity” both “facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind” and
“all facts on which [a] belief [related to the existence of a
material omission] is formed.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1), (2).
To plead possession, a plaintiff must “allege specifically
what information [a defendant] obtained, when and from
whom he obtained it, and how he used it for his own
advantage.” Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 672. Otherwise, a
defendant could not “respond to the complaint other than by
generally denying that he ever obtained any material,
adverse nonpublic information . . . which he then used to
trade . . . securities for his own benefit.” Id.
Walleye does not meet this stringent pleading standard.
The SAC neither adequately pleads that Silver Lake, BC
Partners, and McGlade knew about the November 5, 2019,
meeting, nor that the fact of the meeting, or any information
learned there, constitutes material, non-public information.
A. Walleye did not adequately plead that Silver
Lake knew about the meeting with the FCC.
Walleye’s pleadings that implicate Silver Lake do not
specifically allege the who, what, when, where, or how that
20 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
entity learned of the November 5, 2019, meeting prior to
selling Intelsat shares.
The SAC alleges that “Silver Lake was Intelsat’s second
largest shareholder, owning about 9% of the Company prior
to the relevant sales.” Walleye also alleges that “Silver Lake
. . . [was] entitled to special Board-level information rights
from the Company” and to “receive from the Company upon
reasonable request any information,” including “from time
to time,” “non-public information about the Company.”
Finally, the SAC alleges that “Silver Lake . . . obtained the
material non-public information from Intelsat and in the
context of their roles as insiders of Intelsat . . . and through
their information rights afforded by their shareholder and
governance agreements.” None of the statements from the
confidential witnesses contains any information about when
or how Silver Lake learned of the meeting.
These barebones pleadings do not meet the stringent
pleading standards of the PSLRA because they do not allege
what information Silver Lake specifically obtained or “when
and from whom” Silver Lake obtained it. Neubronner, 6
F.3d at 672. The shareholder agreement referenced by
Walleye11 does not give Silver Lake special information
rights to material, non-public information apart from
information that Silver Lake requests pursuant to bona fide
reporting or other legal obligations. The SAC does not
allege either that Silver Lake requested any such information
or that Silver Lake would be entitled to it had it made such a
request. Thus, even if “must have known” allegations are
sufficient, see Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 672, Walleye does not
11
Silver Lake argues that the shareholder agreement was appropriately
incorporated by reference in the SAC, In re Silverlake, 2022 WL
4485815, at *2 n.3, and Walleye does not dispute this.
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 21
plead any information which leads to the strong inference
that Silver Lake must have known any material non-public
information.
Finally, Walleye argues that Neubronner does not
require plaintiffs to plead “when and from whom” the insider
traders obtained information. This argument misreads
Neubronner, which clearly requires a complaint plead
“times, dates, places, benefits received, and other details”
and affirms dismissal of a complaint where the plaintiff did
“not allege specifically what information [defendant]
obtained” or “when and from whom he obtained it.” 6 F.3d
at 672 (emphasis added).
B. Walleye did not adequately plead that BC
Partners knew about the November 5, 2019,
meeting prior to its trade.
As the district court held, Walleye did not allege with
particularity any communications between Intelsat and BC
Partners on November 5. Confidential Witness Two merely
stated that Intelsat kept the Board apprised of the
negotiations with the FCC through regular board meetings.
But neither Confidential Witness One nor Confidential
Witness Two stated that Intelsat called an emergency board
meeting immediately following the November 5 meeting.
Instead, as the district court noted, they simply asserted that
the “Board was likely kept in the loop,” and that it was
“obvious” the Board was updated.
The other allegations in the SAC are equally vague and
speculative: “[Confidential Witness Two] said that he thinks
the update would have become even more frequent as the
negotiations progressed” and, “[a]ccordingly, it makes sense
that Intelsat’s board members were quickly made aware of
the disastrous November 5th FCC meeting.” Although
22 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
Walleye claims that the “bankruptcy filings further confirm
the frequent informal communications between Intelsat’s
senior insiders,” it identified no communications on
November 5 with BC Partners about the November 5 FCC
meeting.
The confidential witness statements do not allege the
specific information required under Rule 9(b) and the
PSLRA, including who informed BC Partners or how they
were informed. See Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 672. Instead, the
confidential witness statements are to the contrary, stating
that the regular course of action would have been to update
BC Partners at the following board meeting. Even had the
confidential witnesses stated that someone specifically told
BC Partners, or its director-representatives, about the
November 5 FCC meeting, they have no personal knowledge
of such “facts” one way or another, making their statements
unreliable. Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552
F.3d 981, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (“None of these confidential
witness statements establishes the witnesses’ personal
knowledge or reliability by recounting the particulars of the
alleged transgressions.”). Spengler’s bankruptcy testimony
that he neither told nor was aware of anyone else telling the
insider shareholders about the meeting underscores this
deficiency.
Walleye argues that BC Partners’ Board membership
strongly suggests that they would have been updated as to
particularly important information. The cases it cites,
however, are inapposite. In No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint
Counsel Pension Trust Fund v. American West Holding
Corp., 320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003), the operative complaint
alleged sufficient facts to show board members had
knowledge of ongoing, major operational and maintenance
problems, not that board members would necessarily be
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 23
updated about a single event the same day it occurred. Id. at
943. Of course, it would be incredible to say that Intelsat
never informed BC Partners of the results of the meeting, but
it would be a reasonable alternative explanation to say that
BC Partners were informed on a later date. See id. at 943
n.21. Similarly, Berson v. Applied Signal Technologies,
Inc., 527 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), is distinct because, there,
the court assumed directors knew about operational issues
when they were responsible for their company’s day-to-day
operations. Id. at 988. The present case does not involve
day-to-day operational issues, or even issues that occurred
over a long period of time. That Intelsat would have
immediately told BC Partners about the various perspectives
of the participants in the meeting over the course of a few
hours on a particular day is a much weaker inference than
assuming a board member would know about a long-term,
on-going operational issue.
C. Walleye did not adequately plead that McGlade
possessed material non-public information.
For similar reasons, Walleye did not adequately plead
that Intelsat informed McGlade of any material non-public
information. Walleye points to the fact that McGlade often
worked from the Intelsat offices but does not allege that he
did so on November 5. It also points to its vague allegation
that McGlade “stayed heavily involved in the Company,”
which is not enough to survive the requirements of Rule 9(b)
and the PLSRA. Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 672. Finally,
Walleye argues that “to update McGlade . . . about
developments in the C-Band negotiations, Spengler would
just jump on a conference call, rather than waiting to prepare
more formal communications, and that Spengler would
immediately debrief McGlade and others on the 20th floor
with updates.” This allegation too falls short; Spengler
24 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
specifically testified that he did not inform any insider
shareholders about the FCC meeting.
D. Walleye did not adequately plead that the
alleged information was material.
Nor has Walleye sufficiently pleaded that any
information the traders had was material. An omitted fact is
material if there is a “substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important.” TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). A plaintiff
must plead a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.” Id. (emphasis added).
Walleye frames the November 5 meeting as leading to
several independent pieces of material, non-public
information. But the existence of the meeting, Degani’s
body language, and management’s speculation about the
FCC position do not “significantly alter” the total mix of
information available to the public at the time.
First, the fact of the FCC meeting is not material, non-
public information. Given the fact that Intelsat and other
interested parties held 50 or more other meetings with the
FCC over a two-year period, nothing in the SAC indicates
that the fact of the meeting itself would have altered the mix
of already available information. See McCormick, 26 F.3d
at 879 (involvement of investment bankers was not material
where it only confirmed an ongoing search for a prospective
buyer); id. at 881 (fact of meeting with tax expert to discuss
potential tax consequences of a potential transaction was not
material where public was otherwise informed of a potential
transaction).
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP 25
Second, Walleye contends that, despite sworn testimony
of the attendees at the meeting, we should rely on statements
from confidential witnesses not present at the November 5
meeting to conclude that the FCC disclosed its plans to
announce a public auction. We decline to do so. None of
the confidential witnesses has personal knowledge of what
occurred. See Zucco Partners, LLC, 552 F.3d at 997–98.
Their triple hearsay, which does not contain a recounting of
what the FCC said in the meeting, is not reliable under our
precedent. Id. at 997 (“This triple hearsay . . . is not detailed
enough to pass muster.”).
Finally, and in contrast, the SAC outlines the testimony
of SES CEO Collar, who testified that the attendees of the
meeting “all formed slightly different impressions” about
Degani’s position, who was “very quiet” and “responded
only to a handful of questions.” Indeed, Collar continued
that Degani said “something which was hard to interpret”
and “one interpretation of what he said was that . . . we were
running into political objection.” Spengler testified that the
attendees “didn’t know” whether “the tide seemed to be
turning” after the meeting, that Degani was tight-lipped at
the meeting, and that he didn’t respond to questions. None
of this testimony indicates that the FCC disclosed its plan to
reject a private auction.12 Moreover, any conclusion by the
attendees based on Degani’s body language was merely
speculation. See SEC v. Truong, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1098
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (“Courts stress that the SEC may not base
insider trading actions on strained inferences and
speculation.”). The SAC thus does not adequately allege
12
See In re Silverlake, 2022 WL 4485815, at *3 (taking judicial notice
of a variety of public documents suggesting that the political tides were
turning against a private auction).
26 WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES V. SILVER LAKE GROUP
that the fact of, contents of, or impressions surrounding the
FCC meeting constituted material non-public information.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plain English Summary
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT In re: SILVER LAKE GROUP, LLC No.
Key Points
01FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT In re: SILVER LAKE GROUP, LLC No.
034:20-cv- 02341-JSW WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND LTD.; WALLEYE MANAGER OPPORTUNITIES LLC, OPINION Lead Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
04SILVER LAKE GROUP, L.L.C.; SLP III INVESTMENT HOLDINGS S.A R.L.; SILVER LAKE PARTNERS III, L.P.; SILVER LAKE TECHNOLOGY INVESTORS III, L.P.; SILVER LAKE TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES III, L.P.; SLTA III (GP), L.L.C.; BC PARTNERS LLP; SERAFINA S.A.;
Frequently Asked Questions
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT In re: SILVER LAKE GROUP, LLC No.
FlawCheck shows no negative treatment for Walleye Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. v. Silver Lake Group, L.L.C. in the current circuit citation data.
This case was decided on July 24, 2024.
Use the citation No. 10013047 and verify it against the official reporter before filing.