United States v. Mickey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED DEC 3 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6478 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:15-cr-01201-BTM-1 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIE DWAYNE MICKEY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Barry Ted Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 18, 2025 Pasadena, California Before: WARDLAW, IKUTA, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Willie Dwayne Mickey appeals the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Neither 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) nor U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 violates the nondelegation doctrine. Congress delegated to the United States Sentencing * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Commission the power to create policy statements that district courts must follow when reducing a defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Davis, 739 F.3d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 2014). The Commission permissibly exercised that power to create U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010). Congress’s delegation to the Commission did not violate the nondelegation doctrine because Congress provided a sufficient intelligible principle. See United States v. Pheasant, 129 F.4th 576, 579-80 (9th Cir. 2025). Congress dictated how, when, and why the Commission must create policy statements for sentence modification proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), (o), (u). This is a sufficient intelligible principle because Congress “provided some standard constraining discretion.” Pheasant, 129 F.4th at 580 (emphasis in original). We therefore reject Mickey’s nondelegation challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989); Davis, 739 F.3d at 1225.1 Even after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 is binding on district courts because Congress, not the 1 Each of our sister circuits to have confronted the issue has reached the same conclusion. United States v. Erskine, 717 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 525 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Garcia, 655 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Horn, 679 F.3d 397, 405 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Anderson, 686 F.3d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Dryden, 563 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Taylor, 743 F.3d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 2 24-6478 Commission, made policy statements “binding on the courts.” Davis, 739 F.3d at 1226. Congress directed courts to make their sentence reductions “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). “If a sentence reduction is inconsistent with a policy statement, it would violate § 3582(c)’s directive, so policy statements must be binding.” United States v. Garcia, 655 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2011). Neither 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) nor U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 intrudes on a core judicial power. Congress may eliminate or limit courts’ discretion in sentencing. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364; Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991). Here, Congress limited courts’ discretion to reduce a defendant’s sentence by creating statutory requirements for eligibility and mandating that any sentence reduction be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). These limitations do not intrude on a core judicial power because “[a] sentencing scheme providing for ‘individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes.’” Chapman, 500 U.S. at 467 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–605 (1978) (plurality opinion)). The existence of any discretion to reduce a sentence is “not constitutionally compelled” but instead “a congressional act of lenity.” Dillon, 560 U.S. at 828. AFFIRMED. 3 24-6478