Trujillo-Ochoa v. Garland

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 15 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FELIPE TRUJILLO-OCHOA, No. 24-838 Agency No. Petitioner, A072-984-954 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 5, 2024** Phoenix, Arizona Before: HAWKINS, TASHIMA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Felipe Trujillo-Ochoa, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination, in a reasonable fear proceeding, that he failed to demonstrate a reasonable fear of persecution or torture and therefore would * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). not be entitled to withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture from his reinstated removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and review the agency’s determination for substantial evidence. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2018). We deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Trujillo failed to show a reasonable possibility that the harm he fears would be on account of a protected ground. See id. at 814 (no basis for withholding of removal where petitioner did not show a nexus to a protected ground). Consistent with the IJ’s explanation, Trujillo’s testimony indicates that the individuals who threatened him in the past were motivated by pecuniary gain rather than a protected ground. Cf. Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Trujillo failed to show a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836–37 (9th Cir. 2016) (petitioner failed to demonstrate government acquiescence sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 2 24-838