Terazze Taylor v. Washington Department of Corrections

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 23 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TERAZZE A TAYLOR, No. 23-35046 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05224-RJB v. MEMORANDUM* WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; ALYSSA KEKOA- OSHIRO; JAQUELINE NELSON; DAVID SATHERS NELSON; JEFF KINNE; DANIELLE ARMBRUSTER; STEPHEN SINCLAIR; MAURO PARTIDA; GWIN PENSROSE; JOHN DOES 1-50, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding Submitted September 23, 2024** Before: FERNANDEZ, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).  Plaintiff-appellant Terazze Taylor appeals the district court’s summary judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in favor of defendants-appellees Washington Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and several prison officials and employees. We review de novo. Stewart v. Aranas, 32 F.4th 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022) (qualified immunity); Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Taylor’s claims against the Washington DOC and prison officials in their official capacities, because these defendants are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that states or governmental entities that are considered “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes are not “persons” under § 1983; a suit against a state official in their official capacity is no different from a suit against the State itself). The district court properly dismissed Taylor’s state-law claims against the Washington DOC and prison official in their official capacities based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state or its agencies unless state unequivocally consents to waiver of immunity). 2  The district court properly dismissed Taylor’s claims against the individual defendants based on qualified immunity. See Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007) (as amended) (protecting government officials performing discretionary functions if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known). The district court correctly dismissed Taylor’s claim under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), because HIPAA does not contain a private cause of action. See Garmon v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Taylor’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing standard of review and considerations of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity). We decline to review any remaining issues that were not raised before the district court. Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 986 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 3