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No. 10669238
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Sam Jones Company, LLC v. Biotronik, Inc.
No. 10669238 · Decided September 10, 2025
No. 10669238·Ninth Circuit · 2025·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
September 10, 2025
Citation
No. 10669238
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex No. 23-55361
rel. SAM JONES COMPANY, LLC,
Relator, D.C. No.
2:17-cv-01391-
Plaintiff-Appellant, PSG-KS
v.
OPINION
BIOTRONIK, INC.; CEDARS-SINAI
MEDICAL CENTER; JEFFREY
GOODMAN, Dr.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 18, 2024
Pasadena, California
September 10, 2025
Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Morgan B. Christen, and
Anthony D. Johnstone, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Christen
2 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
SUMMARY*
False Claims Act
The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing a
complaint brought under the False Claims Act by Sam Jones
Co., LLC, vacated the district court’s order denying Sam
Jones’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, and
remanded for further proceedings.
Sam Jones alleged a three-way compensation
arrangement involving the sale of implanted cardiac devices
paid for by Medicare and other public health insurance
programs. Under this alleged arrangement, Biotronik, Inc.,
a manufacturer of cardiac rhythm devices, hired Brian
Goodman as a sales representative. Goodman
recommended Biotronik devices to his brother, a doctor who
implanted the devices at Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center. Cedars-Sinai billed federal public health insurance
programs for the devices, and Biotronik paid Goodman a
commission on each sale. Sam Jones alleged that this
compensation arrangement violated the Anti-Kickback
Statute and the Stark Law. The district court dismissed the
action pursuant to the False Claims Act’s public disclosure
bar because the New York Times had already reported that
Biotronik used various financial incentives to encourage
physicians to use its cardiac rhythm management devices
rather than devices sold by Biotronik’s competitors.
The public disclosure bar requires a court to dismiss an
action in which a relator alleges fraud that has already been
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 3
disclosed in a qualifying public document or
proceeding. Because Sam Jones filed its original complaint
in 2017, the panel applied the post-2010 version of the False
Claims Act. The panel held, however, that the outcome of
this appeal would not turn on whether it applied an earlier
version of the statute because the 2010 amendment did not
materially alter the elements required to meet the public
disclosure bar.
Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii), the public
disclosure bar applies if substantially the same allegations or
transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly
disclosed from the news media. The parties agreed that the
New York Times article was public and from the news media
and that the article disclosed a transaction or facts from
which fraud could be inferred. At issue was whether Sam
Jones’s allegations were substantially the same as the
transactions disclosed by the New York Times
article. Following Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565
(9th Cir. 2016), and relying upon Seventh Circuit cases as
benchmarks, the panel concluded that, fairly characterized,
the transaction described in Sam Jones’s complaint did not
merely repeat what the public already knew about
Biotronik's tactics to increase its sales. Rather, when viewed
with the appropriate level of generality, Sam Jones’s
complaint provided genuinely new and material information.
4 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
COUNSEL
Jeremy L. Friedman (argued), Law Office of Jeremy L.
Friedman, Oakland, California; Mychal Wilson, The Law
Office of Mychal Wilson, Santa Monica, California; for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Megan Mocho (argued), Holland & Knight LLP, McLean,
Virginia; Qian (Sheila) Shen, Holland & Knight LLP,
Tysons, Virginia; Jerome H. Friedberg (argued), Jeffrey B.
Isaacs, and Stacey Zill, Isaacs Friedberg Zill LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Paul A. Rigali (argued), Stephen G.
Larson, Mehrunisa Ranjha, and Kimberly E. Wilkinson,
Larson LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-
Appellees.
Shauna Itri (argued), Seeger Weiss LLP, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Justin M. Smigelsky, Seeger Weiss LLP,
Ridgefield Park, New Jersey; Jacklyn DeMar, The Anti-
Fraud Coalition, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae The
Anti-Fraud Coalition.
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 5
OPINION
CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:
Sam Jones Company, LLC appeals a district court order
dismissing its complaint alleging violations of the False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, arising from a three-way
compensation arrangement involving the sale of implanted
cardiac devices paid for by Medicare and other public health
insurance programs. The complaint alleges that Biotronik, a
manufacturer of cardiac rhythm devices, hired Brian
Goodman as a sales representative because his brother, Dr.
Jeffrey Goodman, was then implanting an extremely high
volume of cardiac devices at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in
Los Angeles. According to the complaint, Brian
recommended Biotronik devices to his brother, who
implanted the devices at Cedars-Sinai, Cedars-Sinai billed
federal public health insurance programs for the devices, and
Biotronik paid Brian a commission on each sale. Sam Jones
alleges that this compensation arrangement violated the
Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law. The district court
dismissed the action pursuant to the False Claims Act’s
public disclosure bar because the New York Times had
already reported that Biotronik used various financial
incentives to encourage physicians to use its cardiac rhythm
management devices rather than devices sold by Biotronik’s
competitors. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.
I.
A.
The False Claims Act (FCA) imposes civil liability on
anyone who “knowingly presents” a “fraudulent claim for
payment” to the federal government. 31 U.S.C.
6 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A). The FCA allows private citizens, referred
to as “relators,” to bring qui tam actions on behalf of the
government. A relator in a successful FCA proceeding
receives a portion of any recovery from the action or
settlement that the court decides is reasonable, but in any
event, somewhere between fifteen and thirty percent of any
proceeds. § 3730(d). Once notified of the suit, the statute
requires the government to determine whether to commit
public resources to pursue the relator’s claims. The
government must investigate, § 3730(a), and, after it
completes its investigation, notify the court if it will
intervene in the relator’s suit. If the government declines to
intervene, the relator may proceed alone. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
Relators “have the requisite personal stake in the outcome of
the case to ensure that the issues are presented sharply”
because they: (1) must fund the prosecution of the FCA suit;
(2) receive a sizable bounty if they prevail in the action; and
(3) may be liable for costs if the suit is frivolous. United
States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir.
1993).
The FCA does not allow every suit to go forward. For
example, Congress barred claims brought by relators
convicted of criminal conduct arising from a scheme to
defraud the government. § 3730(d)(3). Similarly, the “first-
to-file bar” prohibits relators from bringing qui tam suits
while another relator’s action involving the same conduct is
pending, § 3730(b)(5), and the “government-action bar”
knocks out actions “based upon allegations or transactions
which are the subject of a civil suit . . . in which the
Government is already a party,” § 3730(e)(3).
At issue here, the “public disclosure bar” requires a court
to dismiss an action in which a relator alleges fraud that has
already been disclosed in a qualifying public document or
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 7
proceeding. § 3730(e)(4)(A). If the public disclosure bar
applies, a relator may overcome it by demonstrating that she
was an “original source” of the information. Id. An
“original source” includes one who has knowledge that “is
independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions.” § 3730(e)(4)(B). In creating
the public disclosure bar, Congress sought “to strike a
balance between encouraging private persons to root out
fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits.” Graham Cnty. Soil &
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
559 U.S. 280, 295 (2010).
B.
In 2011, the New York Times published a series of
articles chronicling Biotronik’s strategies to increase its
market share for cardiac rhythm management (CRM)
devices, including pacemakers and defibrillators. One
article, published June 1, 2011, focused on Biotronik’s
“success in developing relationships with doctors who, in
turn, can influence which brand of device a patient gets.”1
Barry Meier, Sales Tactics on Implants Raise Doubts, N.Y.
Times, June 1, 2011, at B1. The article outlined a series of
internal documents from Biotronik that “offer a portrait of
an implant industry where producers seek to influence the
brand of device that patients receive long before a
diagnosis.” Id. The article identified several manufacturers
as “big makers of implants like heart devices and artificial
joints . . . [who] have settled Justice Department charges that
they illegally promoted sales.” Id. The article reported that
1
The district court and the parties refer to this article as the May 31, 2011
article. The article was published online on May 31, 2011, but it
appeared in the Business/Financial Desk section in the newspaper on
June 1, 2011.
8 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
the Department of Justice sought to “reduce the role of
corporate influence over medicine through tactics like bogus
or inflated consulting deals with doctors.” Id.
According to the article, the Department of Justice had
been investigating Biotronik’s sales and marketing practices
since 2010. Id. The article reported that Biotronik’s
strategies included recruiting implant specialists, and
general cardiologists who refer patients to implant
specialists, as “consultants.” Id. Biotronik allegedly paid
referring cardiologists, called “feeders” in Biotronik
documents, $4,800 for each patient they enrolled in
Biotronik-financed studies. Id. The article also mentioned
a common industry practice used by medical device
manufacturers to increase sales: hiring family members of
implanting physicians or referring cardiologists. Id. The
article did not elaborate on the position(s) in which family
members might be employed or the duties they might
perform. The article opined that this practice would not be
uncovered by recently enacted legislation designed to
increase transparency in the financial relationships between
pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers and
physicians, and it suggested that Biotronik’s practices fell
within that gap:
[T]he new law will not shed light on what the
Biotronik documents indicate is a widely
used industry practice: the hiring by a device
maker of a doctor’s spouse or other relative.
For example, in plotting strategies to gain
sales at one California hospital, Biotronik
officials suggested that an implant specialist,
whose son and wife both worked for a
competitor, might be wooed if Biotronik
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 9
offered him concessions “such as studies or
even the hiring of his son,” according to an
internal company report.2
Id.
The New York Times article explained that Biotronik’s
share of the CRM market had grown from 1 to 5 percent “in
the last few years” and suggested the increase was at least
partly the result of incentives Biotronik paid to physicians.
Id. As an example, the article reported that four implant
specialists in Las Vegas sharply increased their use of
Biotronik devices in mid-2008—about the same time they
became Biotronik consultants—and that the cumulative cost
of the Biotronik devices they implanted skyrocketed to $16
million. Id. Another California specialist quadrupled his use
of Biotronik devices after he became a consultant, increasing
the cost of the Biotronik CRM devices purchased for his
patients from $360,000 to $1.6 million over a 12-month
period. Id.
As Biotronik’s market share increased, whistleblowers
began to step forward. Ex-employee relators brought qui
tam actions alleging Biotronik promoted off-label uses for
its devices, paid consulting fees to physicians for referring
patients to sham studies, paid “training” fees to physicians
for allowing Biotronik employees to observe implant
procedures, and supplied implant specialists with a steady
stream of sports tickets, gift cards, seats to Broadway plays
2
Sam Jones asserts that this reference is to the Physician Payments
Sunshine Act (PPSA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h. The PPSA requires
makers of medical devices covered by Medicare to report on an annual
basis certain payments to “covered recipients.” § 1320a-7h(a)(1)(A).
Physicians are “covered recipients” under the statute, but family
members of physicians are not. § 1320a-7h(e)(6)(A).
10 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
and operas, and extravagant dinners and travel. See United
States ex rel. Bennett v. Biotronik, Inc., 876 F.3d 1011, 1014
(9th Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. Sant v. Biotronik, Inc.,
No. 2:09-cv-03617, Dkt. 85 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009).
The whistleblowers in Sant and Bennett alleged that
Biotronik violated two federal statutes: the Stark Law, 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn, and the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b). The Anti-Kickback Statute makes it illegal
to offer, pay, or receive anything of value as an inducement
to generate business payable by Medicare or Medicaid.
§ 1320a-7b(b). The Stark Law prohibits the submission of
Medicare or Medicaid claims for certain services performed
as a result of patient referrals from physicians who have
improper “financial relationship[s]” with an entity to which
they refer patients. § 1395nn(a)(1). The Sant and Bennett
complaints alleged that a portion of Biotronik’s profits came
from claims submitted to Medicare or Medicaid.
Plaintiff-Appellant Sam Jones is a limited liability
company established in 2017. It consists of two managing
members: Leo Williams and Mark O’Connor. Both
Williams and O’Connor previously worked for Biotronik as
cardiac device sales representatives—Williams from 2008 to
2011 and O’Connor from 2008 to 2014. As sales
representatives at Biotronik, Williams and O’Connor
worked directly with physicians. Their duties sometimes
included attending implant surgeries at Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center in Los Angeles. Williams and O’Connor
also attended Cedars-Sinai physician special events such as
family dinners and birthday parties. The two had access to
Biotronik’s pricing, marketing, and reimbursement
information for devices implanted at Cedars-Sinai.
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 11
Sam Jones filed suit in 2017 against Biotronik, Dr.
Jeffrey Goodman, and Cedars-Sinai (Defendants). The
complaint alleged six counts of unlawful billing under the
FCA and numerous violations of state statutes. One of the
FCA claims, Claim V, alleged that Biotronik offered
inducements to referring cardiologists and implanting
electrophysiologists that included dinners, conferences,
entertainment, paid expenses for travel, meals and lodging,
free business development, consulting fees, and payments
for recruiting patients to participate in Biotronik’s research.
Sam Jones voluntarily dismissed Claim V. Its remaining
FCA claims are based only on what the complaint describes
as a “nationwide scheme” of Biotronik “entering into
financial relationships with referring and implanting
physicians throughout the country by employing their close
family members.” Sam Jones’s complaint focused on one
instance of Biotronik’s alleged “nationwide scheme”: a
three-way compensation arrangement that paid commissions
to Brian Goodman for implant surgeries performed by Dr.
Jeffrey Goodman at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that, from August 2008
and continuing through 2019:
[E]ach Defendant entered into written and
oral agreements involving the selection of
Biotronik’s CRM devices by Dr. Goodman
for the CRM implant surgeries he performed
at Cedars-Sinai, the purchase of Biotronik’s
CRM devices for Dr. Goodman’s surgeries
by Cedars-Sinai, the submission of a claim
for coverage to Medicare, Medicaid, other
federal health insurance programs or private
insurance companies for the device and
associated health care services, and the
12 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
payment of commissions to Biotronik
employee Brian Goodman in amounts that
varied with the number of devices his brother
Dr. Goodman implanted.
The complaint alleges that Brian Goodman “lacked the
skills and abilit[ies] possessed by typical sales
representatives that would justify the opportunities and
substantial commissions paid to top sales performers” and
that his previous employer, Medtronic, had terminated him
for poor performance selling CRM devices. The complaint
alleges that, despite this history, Biotronik hired Brian
Goodman as a sales representative—the same position held
by Williams and O’Connor—and paid Brian Goodman
fifteen to twenty percent sales commissions on all Biotronik
devices implanted by his brother. The complaint alleges that
the commissions Biotronik paid to Brian for devices
implanted by Dr. Goodman at Cedars-Sinai totaled over one
million dollars.
The complaint asserts that in 2008, the year Brian
Goodman became a sales representative for Biotronik, Dr.
Goodman implanted zero Biotronik CRMs. In 2009, after
Brian was moved to his brother’s territory, Dr. Goodman
implanted one Biotronik device; in 2010 he implanted six, in
2011 he implanted fifty-one and by 2015, Dr. Goodman had
allegedly implanted 443 Biotronik CRMs in total. Sam
Jones alleges that between 2013 and 2018, Medicare paid for
at least 692 Biotronik CRM devices implanted or replaced
by Dr. Goodman, and that when Brian Goodman left
Biotronik and returned to work at Medtronic, Dr. Goodman
ceased implanting Biotronik’s devices altogether and started
exclusively implanting Medtronic devices. The complaint
asserts that the government would not have paid for these
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 13
devices had it been aware of Defendants’ compensation
arrangement because the arrangement violated the Stark
Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute.3
According to the complaint, as sales representatives at
Biotronik, Williams and O’Connor were required to undergo
annual code-of-compliance training and were subjected to
annual exams on the medical device industry’s rules for
avoiding illegal payments to physicians, “including,
specifically, the rule that they were not allowed to work with
their own immediate family members.” Likewise, the
complaint alleges that Cedars-Sinai was required to certify
its compliance with the Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback
Statute when it submitted claims for payment to Medicare,
and that Cedars-Sinai was aware that these laws prohibited
compensation arrangements involving physician family
members, but it “agreed to look the other way” because it
“stood to profit from the CRM surger[ies].”
C.
The United States declined to intervene in Sam Jones’s
suit. Biotronik, Cedars-Sinai, and Dr. Goodman
subsequently filed motions to dismiss the complaint. The
district court granted the motions on the ground that the New
York Times article triggered the public disclosure bar and
3
The district court characterized Sam Jones’s claims as being based on
a “nepotistic hiring practice,” but that term is not used in the complaint.
Sam Jones does not allege that nepotism itself is unlawful. Its contention
is that Defendants’ arrangement was unlawful because Brian’s
compensation varied with the number of Biotronik devices Dr. Goodman
prescribed, which served as an unlawful inducement that generated
claims paid by Medicare and Medicaid in violation of the Anti-Kickback
Statute and also constituted an improper financial relationship that
violated the Stark Law. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(a)(1)(B), 1320a-
7b(b)(1)(B).
14 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
Sam Jones failed to show that it could qualify for the original
source exception.
Sam Jones responded by filing a motion to alter or amend
the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e). The motion argued that the district court should have
granted leave to amend the complaint to include facts
demonstrating Sam Jones qualified as an original source.
The district court denied the motion as futile because it
concluded that the facts Sam Jones sought to add would not
cure the other deficiencies in its argument that it qualified as
an original source. Sam Jones appeals both the order
dismissing the complaint and the order denying its Rule
59(e) motion for leave to amend.
II.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion
to dismiss, Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2021),
and review for abuse of discretion orders denying Rule 59(e)
motions, Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., 953 F.3d 567,
573 (9th Cir. 2020).
III.
A.
The public disclosure bar requires that courts dismiss
claims filed pursuant to the FCA if they are substantially the
same as allegations of fraud that have already been publicly
disclosed. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The parties’ dispute boils down
to whether the June 1, 2011 New York Times article
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 15
triggered the public disclosure bar. If it did not, there is no
need to consider the original source exception to the bar.4
We begin with the statutory text of the public disclosure
bar, which provides: “The court shall dismiss an action or
claim under this section, unless opposed by the Government,
if substantially the same allegations or transactions as
alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed.”
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). The current version of the public
disclosure bar is a product of a century-old series of
amendments through which Congress has aimed to
incentivize relators to come forward with information
uncovering schemes to defraud the public fisc, while still
disallowing copycat suits that do little more than repackage
previously disclosed scams and attempt to collect bounties
for doing so. In interpreting the current text of the public
disclosure bar, we consider the historical progression of
amendments to the bar.
Coined the “Lincoln Law,” Congress originally enacted
the FCA to combat fraudulent schemes perpetrated against
the government during the Civil War, after defense
contractors sold the Union Army sick horses and mules,
faulty rifles and ammunition, and rancid provisions. See
Larry D. Lahman, Bad Mules: A Primer on the Federal
4
Defendants offered five articles in support of their motions to dismiss,
but the district court relied solely on the June 1, 2011 article. Defendants
also offered the Sant and Bennett complaints, although they primarily
rely on Sant. We took judicial notice of the five articles and the Sant and
Bennett complaints. The allegations in Sant and Bennett concerned
consulting fees paid to physicians for referring patients, fees paid to
physicians for referring patients to participate in sham studies, as well as
sports tickets and dinners Biotronik provided to physicians. See Bennett,
876 F.3d at 1014. Sam Jones’s original complaint contained comparable
allegations, but Sam Jones voluntarily dismissed them.
16 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
False Claims Act, 76 Okla. Bar J. 901, 901 (2005). As
originally enacted, the FCA allowed relators to file claims
without regard to how they had discovered the underlying
fraud. As a result, the FCA’s promise of bounty incentivized
some relators to bring claims the Supreme Court ultimately
termed “parasitic,” because the government already had
reason to know about the fraud, or in some cases, because
the relators’ claims were copied directly from government
documents. Graham County, 559 U.S. at 294.
Private citizens did not heavily employ the FCA until the
New Deal and World War II, when a spike in government
spending created an abundance of opportunities for
contractors to defraud the government. See Minn. Ass’n of
Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d
1032, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002). In what is now considered the
quintessential parasitic suit, United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), a relator read about contractors
collusively averaging prospective bids for government
projects in a publicly filed criminal indictment and copied
the allegations from that indictment directly into his
complaint. The Supreme Court concluded that the FCA did
not prevent a relator who “ha[d] contributed nothing to the
discovery of [the fraud]” from recouping the bounty the
statute promised him. Id. at 545. The Court acknowledged
the government’s “strong arguments of policy against”
permitting such piggy-back lawsuits but explained that “the
trouble with these arguments is that they are addressed to the
wrong forum. Conditions may have changed, but the statute
has not.” Id. at 546–47.
Congress responded swiftly to Hess. As amended in
1943, the FCA barred qui tam suits that were “based upon
evidence or information in the possession of the United
States . . . at the time such suit was brought.” Act of Dec.
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 17
23, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608, 609 (codified at
31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1946)). This became known as the
“government knowledge bar.”
The government knowledge bar proved to be an
overcorrection.5 Graham County, 559 U.S. at 294. Courts
read the 1943 amendment as prohibiting all qui tam suits
based on information the government possessed, even where
the government knew of the fraud “only because the relator
had been decent enough to tell the government about it.”
Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412,
1419 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled by United States ex rel.
Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.
2015).
Congress amended the FCA again in 1986. This time,
Congress replaced the government knowledge bar with the
public disclosure bar, which precluded suits whose claims
were “based upon” previously disclosed fraudulent schemes.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1986). Congress also added the
5
This overcorrection is best exemplified by United States ex rel.
Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984), where the State of
Wisconsin brought a qui tam suit based on Medicaid fraud that it had
already reported to the federal government pursuant to the mandatory
reporting requirements established under the Social Security Act and its
implementing regulations. See 42 C.F.R. § 455.17 (1980). Interpreting
the 1943 amendment, the Seventh Circuit held that the government
knowledge bar deprived the court of jurisdiction because the federal
government technically knew about the fraud before Wisconsin filed
suit. Id. at 1102–04. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Congress’s
immediate concern in enacting the 1943 amendment was to undo the
havoc wreaked by Hess, but observed that “the language and effect of
the . . . amendment in fact is much broader.” Id. at 1104. Within months,
the National Association of Attorneys General adopted a resolution
urging Congress “to rectify the unfortunate result of the Wisconsin v.
Dean decision.” S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 13 (1986).
18 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
original source exception. This iteration of the statute
allowed suits involving allegations of fraud that had been
publicly disclosed if the relator qualified as an “original
source” of the information. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (1986).
Under the 1986 version of the FCA, an original source was
required to have both direct and independent knowledge of
the information upon which their allegations were based.
United States ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp., 565
F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled in part by
Hartpence, 792 F.3d at 1128 n.6. The Supreme Court has
observed that “Congress passed the 1986 amendments to the
FCA ‘to strengthen the Government’s hand in fighting false
claims’” and “to encourage more private enforcement suits.”
Graham County, 559 U.S. at 298 (quoting Cook County v.
United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 133–34
(2003)).
After disagreement arose between circuit courts over the
correct interpretation of the original source exception,
Congress amended the FCA a third time. Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 10104, 124 Stat. 119, 901 (2010); see, e.g., Wang, 975
F.2d at 1417–18. The 2010—and current—version of the
FCA’s public disclosure bar provides:
The court shall dismiss an action or claim
under this section, unless opposed by the
Government, if substantially the same
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 19
allegations or transactions as alleged in the
action or claim were publicly disclosed—
(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing in which the
Government or its agent is a party;
(ii) in a congressional, Government
Accountability Office, or other
Federal report, hearing, audit, or
investigation; or
(iii) from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is
an original source of the information.6
§ 3730(e)(4)(A).
The 2010 amendment made several changes to the FCA.
Most pertinent to this appeal, instead of prohibiting claims
“based upon” a public disclosure, the bar now prohibits suits
in which the allegations are “substantially the same” as those
already publicly disclosed. The 2010 amendment does not
provide guidance regarding the degree of specificity
required before a claim is deemed “substantially the same”
as a publicly disclosed allegation. But at a minimum,
6
The statute goes on to define an original source as “an individual who
either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has
voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on which
allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or [(ii)] who has
knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly
disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily provided
the information to the Government before filing an action under this
section.” § 3730(e)(4)(B).
20 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
replacing “based upon” with “substantially the same” did not
expand the scope of the bar.
B.
We first consider whether the pre- or post-2010 version
of the FCA applies to Sam Jones’s complaint. In Sam
Jones’s view, the 2010 amendment narrowed the public
disclosure bar. Biotronik counters that Sam Jones misreads
our precedent, and that our circuit’s analysis remains the
same under the 1986 and 2010 versions of the statute. We
agree with Biotronik. In previous cases, we applied the
version of the FCA in effect when the relator filed the
original complaint. See United States ex rel. Mateski v.
Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565, 569 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016);
Amphastar Pharms. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, 856 F.3d
696, 702 n.7 (9th Cir. 2017). Because Sam Jones filed its
original complaint in 2017, we apply the post-2010 version
of the FCA, but the outcome of this appeal would not turn
on which version of the statute we apply.
In United States v. Allergan, Inc., 46 F.4th 991, 996 n.5
(9th Cir. 2022), we explained that the 2010 amendment “did
not materially alter the elements required to meet the public
disclosure bar.” We reasoned that the 2010 amendment
codified a consensus between our circuit and most other
circuit courts that had already interpreted “based upon”
narrowly to mean “substantially similar to.” See Meyer, 565
F.3d at 1199 (interpreting “based upon” to mean
“substantially similar to”); United States ex rel. Ondis v. City
of Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2009)
(substantially similar to); Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants,
Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2009) (substantially similar
to); United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of City
of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 386–88 (3d Cir. 1999)
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 21
(substantially similar to); United States ex rel. Findley v.
FPC-Boron Emps.’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 682–85 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (substantially similar to), abrogated on other grounds
by United States ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia, 679
F.3d 832 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States ex rel. Fine v.
Advanced Scis., Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996)
(interpreting “based upon” to require “substantial identity”);
United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1997) (substantial
identity), abrogated on other grounds by United States ex
rel. Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp., 3 F.4th 813 (6th Cir. 2021);
Allina Health, 276 F.3d at 1045–47 (adopting majority
reading).7 Because we have concluded that the 2010
amendment merely confirmed our pre-existing interpretation
of the public disclosure bar, our circuit precedent
interpreting “based upon” remains undisturbed, and is thus
applicable here. Silbersher v. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, Inc., 89
F.4th 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2024).
C.
The public disclosure bar applies if “substantially the
same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or
claim were publicly disclosed . . . (iii) from the news
media.” § 3730(e)(4)(A). The parties agree that the New
York Times article was public and “from the news media”
within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii). The parties also
agree that the article discloses only a “transaction,” or “facts
from which fraud can be inferred,” not an “allegation” or
7
By 2009, all but one circuit held this majority view; the Fourth Circuit
alone interpreted “based upon” to mean “derived from.” United States
ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co. ex rel. Microbiology Sys. Div.,
21 F.3d 1339, 1348 (4th Cir. 1994).
22 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
“direct claim of fraud.”8 See Silbersher, 89 F.4th at 1167
(quoting Mateski, 816 F.3d at 571). The only remaining
issue is whether Sam Jones’s allegations are “substantially
the same as” the transactions disclosed by the New York
Times article in 2011.
To bar a relator’s complaint, a public disclosure must
have revealed both the misrepresented state of affairs and the
true state of facts from which an observer could deduce that
fraud is afoot. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal
Railway Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
United States ex rel. Found. Aiding The Elderly v. Horizon
W., 265 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting
Springfield Terminal’s analysis to compare a relator’s
complaint to a prior public disclosure); see also Mateski, 816
F.3d at 571. When the “critical mass of the underlying facts
. . . in the qui tam complaint have been disclosed,” the public
disclosure bar applies. Amphastar, 856 F.3d at 703.
Prior to Mateski, our cases fell “at the far ends of the
similarity spectrum,” with complaints that were either
“virtually identical” to or “completely different” from the
prior disclosures. Mateski, 816 F.3d at 573. In Mateski, we
addressed for the first time a case that “f[ell] between the
poles,” where the outcome depended on the level of
generality with which we viewed the prior public disclosure.
Id. at 575. We relied upon three Seventh Circuit cases as
benchmarks to guide our comparison: United States ex rel.
8
“An allegation of fraud is an explicit accusation of wrongdoing.”
Mateski, 816 F.3d at 571 (quoting United States ex rel. Zizic v.
Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2013)). “A
transaction warranting an inference of fraud is one that is composed of a
misrepresented state of facts plus the actual state of facts.” Id. (quoting
Zizic, 728 F.3d at 235–36).
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 23
Baltazar v. Warden, 635 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2011), United
States ex rel. Goldberg v. Rush University Medical Center,
680 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), and Leveski v. ITT Educational
Services, Inc., 719 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2013). Mateski, 816
F.3d at 575–77.
Most pertinent to this appeal is the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Goldberg. Goldberg arose after a Department of
Health and Human Services audit indicated, and a – report
confirmed, that many of the 125 teaching hospitals affiliated
with medical schools in the United States were billing the
federal government for unsupervised work performed by
medical residents. 680 F.3d at 933–34. Goldberg explained
that Medicare pays teaching hospitals for residents’ work on
a fee-for-service basis only when attending physicians
supervise them. Id. at 934. Technically, those payments are
for services rendered by the supervising physician; the cost
of educating residents is reimbursed through government
grants. Id. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report disclosed that because Medicare was paying for the
services rendered by absent faculty members, and the cost of
educating residents was reimbursed through government
grants, teaching hospitals that billed on a fee-for-service
basis for unsupervised services effectively received double
compensation. Id.
The relators in Goldberg alleged that a particular hospital
billed for residents’ services that were inadequately
supervised. Id. at 934–35. According to the Goldberg
complaint, a particular university allowed faculty at a
teaching hospital to supervise multiple procedures
simultaneously and then billed Medicare as though the
attending physician had supervised each procedure. Id. at
935. Because Medicare regulations permit reimbursement
only when teaching physicians are “present during all critical
24 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
portions of the procedure and immediately available to
furnish services during the entire service or procedure,” the
relator in Goldberg alleged that the supervising physicians
had presented fraudulent claims to the federal government.
Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 415.172(a)(1)).
The district court dismissed the claims pursuant to the
public disclosure bar, but the Seventh Circuit vacated that
decision. Id. at 934–36. It concluded that the public
disclosure bar did not apply because the Goldberg complaint
alleged a materially different practice than the one described
by the GAO report. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
“[u]nless we understand the ‘unsupervised services’
conclusion of the GAO report and the HHS audits at the
highest level of generality—as covering all ways that
supervision could be missing or inadequate—the allegations
of these relators are not ‘substantially similar.’” Id. at 936.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that “boosting the level of
generality in order to wipe out qui tam suits that rest on
genuinely new and material information is not sound.” Id.;
see also Baltazar, 635 F.3d at 867–68 (holding public report
disclosing that some chiropractors submitted bills to
Medicare for services that were not covered, and “up-coded”
claims for other services, did not bar a qui tam suit against a
particular chiropractor who intentionally up-coded services);
Leveski, 719 F.3d at 823–27, 832 (holding school’s scheme
to boost Higher Education Act funding it received on a per-
student basis, by compensating recruitment representatives
based on the number of students they recruited, was not
substantially similar to a “more sophisticated, second-
generation method of violating the HEA” in which the
school compensated financial aid administrators based on
the number of students they helped apply for financial aid).
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 25
In Mateski, we observed that “[t]he practical
consequence of adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach to
defining substantial similarity is to allow relators who
provide the Government with genuinely new and material
information of fraud to move forward with their qui tam
suits.” Mateski, 816 F.3d at 579. We reasoned that holding
otherwise would disincentivize relators from stepping
forward, and that allowing a public document describing
generalized fraud across a swath of an industry to bar all
FCA suits identifying specific instances of fraud “would
deprive the Government of information that could lead to
recovery of misspent Government funds and prevention of
further fraud.” Id. at 577. We apply the same rule here. At
the same time, we are mindful that in its many efforts to fine-
tune the FCA, Congress has consistently sought to strike a
balance between incentivizing whistleblowers to uncover
fraud and barring copycat claims that do not add materially
new information to facts that have been previously
disclosed.
Fairly characterized, the transactions described in Sam
Jones’s complaint do not merely repeat what the public
already knew about Biotronik’s tactics to increase its sales.
When viewed with the appropriate level of generality
described by the benchmarks in Goldberg, Baltazar, and
Leveski, Sam Jones’s complaint provided genuinely new and
material information. The New York Times article reported
that Biotronik aggressively sought to sell more of its CRM
devices by providing significant financial incentives to
doctors who prescribe them, and to doctors who referred
patients to other doctors who prescribed them, but the
specific strategies the article described differ markedly from
those alleged in the operative complaint. The article
identified per-patient fees paid to cardiologists for enrolling
26 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
patients in “unscientific studies” that Biotronik allegedly
designed “as a means of funneling money to doctors.” The
article identified Biotronik’s alleged practice of retaining
physicians as “consultants” and paying them thousands of
dollars in flat fees per month. It also mentioned hiring “a
doctor’s spouse or other relative” without indicating the
position for which they might be hired and without any
suggestion of employing family members as sales
representatives who would be compensated on a commission
basis according to the number of Biotronik devices
implanted by their family member doctor. The article said
nothing about the Stark Law or the Anti-Kickback Statute; it
did not explicitly state or even imply that Biotronik’s alleged
practice of hiring doctors’ relatives violates federal law or
constitutes an improper billing practice. The article did not
suggest that the government paid for those devices with
taxpayer dollars. The article briefly mentioned Max
Bennett, a former employee of Biotronik and relator in a qui
tam action, but it did not detail the allegations of his suit.
The article refers to hospitals and doctors in Tucson,
Arizona, Sacramento, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada,
but nowhere does it refer to any hospital or doctor in
Southern California.
Defendants argue that the public disclosure bar may
preclude a relator’s suit even where the disclosure fails to
identify the qui tam defendants. But the New York Times
article omitted much more than Dr. Goodman and Cedars-
Sinai’s identities. Further, the case law Defendants rely
upon involved disclosures that revealed sufficient
information to identify members of small and finite groups
of contractors positioned to replicate the same fraud. United
States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1017–19
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding public filing contained enough
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 27
information to allow government to investigate narrow class
of local electrical contractors who conspired with IBEW
Local 1547 to skim employee wages in violation of federal
law); see also United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70
F.3d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding public disclosure
that revealed two of the nine privately-operated laboratories
under the Department of Energy’s administrative oversight
misappropriated nuclear waste funds gave government
sufficient information to investigate the remaining seven).
By contrast, the compensation arrangement Sam Jones
describes could be replicated at every hospital in the United
States that accepts federal health insurance to purchase
medical devices. Defendants do not explain how the sales
commissions paid to Dr. Goodman’s brother would have
been readily identifiable from the invoices for Biotronik’s
devices.
In Goldberg, the GAO report disclosed only that
teaching hospitals were billing for unsupervised procedures
and the relator identified a specific teaching hospital that was
billing for under-supervised procedures. Similarly here, the
New York Times article suggested only that Biotronik may
have hired family members of doctors in unspecified
positions to increase its share of the CRM market. It did not
disclose that Biotronik paid commissions per device or
submitted claims to Medicare and Medicaid for the cost of
the CRM devices in violation of the Stark Law or the Anti-
Kickback Statute. Because the article did not disclose the
“critical mass of the underlying facts . . . in the qui tam
complaint,” Amphastar, 856 F.3d at 703, the public
disclosure bar does not preclude Sam Jones’s second
amended complaint.
28 USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC.
D.
Defendants filed a motion for judicial notice of four
other New York Times articles and the complaints in Sant
and Bennett, which we granted. Even if we read the June 1,
2011 article in combination with the other New York Times
articles, Defendants have not met their burden of showing
that the public disclosure bar applies. The complaints in
Sant and Bennett alleged that Biotronik paid consulting fees
to physicians for referring patients, paid fees to physicians
for referring patients to participate in sham studies, and
incentivized physicians with sports tickets, travel, and
expensive dinners. Sam Jones’s original complaint included
these allegations, but it voluntarily dismissed those
allegations from its operative complaint. Thus, considered
cumulatively, the articles and the Sant and Bennett
complaints do not trigger the public disclosure bar because
no combination of those public documents disclosed the
three-way compensation arrangement central to Sam Jones’s
second amended complaint.
The district court did not reach any of Defendants’ other
arguments for dismissal, and we do not reach them in the
first instance.9 See Silbersher, 89 F.4th at 1169. And
because the public disclosure bar does not apply, we do not
reach the original source inquiry. Accordingly, Sam Jones’s
Rule 59(e) motion requesting leave to amend the complaint
is moot.
9
Defendants also argued that the complaint should be dismissed
because: (1) the FCA’s government action bar applies; (2) Sam Jones
failed to meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a) and 9(b); (3) the applicable statute of limitations partially
bars Sam Jones’s claims; and (4) the related state-law claims fail for
various reasons.
USA EX REL. JONES V. BIOTRONIK, INC. 29
IV.
We reverse the district court’s order dismissing Sam
Jones’s action, vacate as moot the district court’s order
denying Sam Jones’s Rule 59(e) motion, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED.
Plain English Summary
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex No.
Key Points
01FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex No.
02OPINION BIOTRONIK, INC.; CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER; JEFFREY GOODMAN, Dr., Defendants-Appellees.
03Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 18, 2024 Pasadena, California September 10, 2025 Before: Johnnie B.
04SUMMARY* False Claims Act The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing a complaint brought under the False Claims Act by Sam Jones Co., LLC, vacated the district court’s order denying Sam Jones’s motion to alter or amend the jud
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FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex No.
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