Ryan Pierce v. Kilolo Kijakazi

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 10 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RYAN LEE PIERCE, No. 22-35387 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05384-MAT v. MEMORANDUM* KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted July 13, 2023 Seattle, Washington Before: GRABER, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges. Ryan Lee Pierce appeals the district court’s order affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo the district court’s order. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). We may set aside the ALJ’s denial of benefits “only if * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based in legal error.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 1. The ALJ did not err by giving “minimal weight” to the examination findings and assessments of state agency physicians Dr. Neims, Dr. Wheeler, Dr. Krueger, Dr. Eisenhauer, and Dr. Ruddell. The ALJ analyzed each state agency physician’s opinion separately, but ultimately gave them less weight for the same reasons: that they appeared to lack an objective basis and were inconsistent with Pierce’s medical record as a whole. These reasons were “specific and legitimate” and supported by substantial evidence. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 494. The ALJ explained that the state agency physicians seemed to rest their findings largely on Pierce’s subjective reports, which the ALJ found to be unreliable because of Pierce’s “disability conviction.” Their opinions were also inconsistent with the opinions of the treating physicians who saw Pierce more regularly throughout the 2000s and 2010s. Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight the ALJ gives to that medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). 2. The ALJ also did not err by giving “minimal weight” to the statement of Pierce’s physical therapist, Ms. Larsen, and to the statement of Pierce’s father. Opinions of physical therapists are not entitled to the same deference as the 2 opinions of providers within the definition of “acceptable medical sources,” but ALJs must still give “germane” reasons for assigning less weight to or rejecting their opinions. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 655 (9th Cir. 2017); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b), (f). The ALJ permissibly explained that she gave less weight to Ms. Larsen’s opinion because it was expressly based on a single 30- minute evaluation and relied heavily on the claimant’s subjective reporting of symptoms. “An ALJ need only give germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses. Inconsistency with medical evidence is one such reason.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). As with the state agency physicians, the ALJ gave less weight to Pierce’s father’s statements because his statements were inconsistent with Pierce’s medical record as a whole. Accordingly, the ALJ gave “germane reasons” for giving less weight to Ms. Larsen’s and Pierce’s father’s statements. AFFIRMED. 3