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No. 10365580
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Osheske v. Silver Cinemas Acquisition Company
No. 10365580 · Decided March 27, 2025
No. 10365580·Ninth Circuit · 2025·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
March 27, 2025
Citation
No. 10365580
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL OSHESKE, individually and No. 23-3882
on behalf of all others similarly
D.C. No.
situated,
2:22-cv-09463-
HDV-JC
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
OPINION
SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION
COMPANY, doing business as
Landmark Theaters,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Hernan Diego Vera, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 7, 2024
San Francisco, California
March 27, 2025
Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Lucy H. Koh, and
Anthony D. Johnstone, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge McKeown
2 OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION CO.
SUMMARY *
Video Privacy Protection Act
Affirming the district court’s dismissal, for failure to
state a claim, of an action against Silver Cinemas
Acquisition Co., doing business as Landmark Theaters, the
panel held that the Video Privacy Protection Act does not
apply to the business of providing a classic in-theater movie-
going experience.
When plaintiff Paul Osheske bought a movie ticket on
Landmark’s website, Landmark shared the name of the film,
the location of the showing, and Osheske’s unique Facebook
identification number with Facebook.
The VPPA imposes liability on any “video tape service
provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally
identifiable information concerning any consumer of such
provider.” The term “video tape service provider” is defined
in the statute as “any person, engaged in the business . . . of
rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes
or similar audio visual materials.” The panel held that, under
a straightforward construction of the statutory text,
buttressed by the statutory history, selling tickets to and
providing an in-theater movie experience does not constitute
a business subject to the VPPA.
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION CO. 3
COUNSEL
Sophia M. Rios (argued), Berger Montague PC, La Mesa,
California; Matthew I. Summers and Joshua P. Davis,
Berger Montague PC, San Francisco, California; for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Bonnie K. DelGobbo (argued) and Joel C. Griswold, Baker
& Hostetler LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Teresa C. Chow, Baker
& Hostetler LLP, Los Angeles, California; Richard B. Raile
and Benjamin D. Janacek, Baker & Hostetler LLP,
Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Moving pictures, or movies, have been around for more
than a century, and developing technologies have
transformed where and how people can watch them—from
the silver screen, to the home television set, to today’s
mobile devices. In this appeal, we consider the scope of a
decades-old law protecting viewers’ privacy, by asking
whether the business of providing a classic in-theater movie-
going experience is subject to the Video Privacy Protection
Act (“VPPA”) of 1988. We agree with the district court that
it does not.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Paul Osheske is a Facebook user and a movie watcher.
Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., known as Landmark
Theatres (“Landmark”), operates movie theaters across the
United States and manages a website where people can
4 OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION CO.
watch trailers for upcoming films, browse showtimes, and
purchase movie tickets. Landmark installed on its website a
Facebook “pixel,” or “web beacon,” programmed to contact
Facebook and transmit user information whenever someone
purchased a ticket while logged into their Facebook account.
After Osheske visited Landmark’s website and bought a
movie ticket, Landmark shared the name of the film, the
location of the showing, and his unique Facebook
identification number with Facebook via the pixel. Osheske
never consented to this disclosure, but his account’s Off-
Facebook Activity Report shows that his information was
sent to Facebook when Landmark’s website confirmed his
purchase of the movie ticket.
Osheske filed a putative class action complaint against
Landmark on behalf of himself and all Facebook users in the
United States whose ticket purchases had been disclosed via
Landmark’s website. Landmark moved to dismiss in March
2023, arguing: (1) that it was not a “video tape service
provider” within reach of the VPPA; (2) that it had not
knowingly disclosed Osheske’s “personally identifiable
information”; and (3) that the Act was unconstitutional
either facially or as applied to a movie theater’s sharing of
information related to a public viewing at a public theater.
The district court granted the motion and dismissed
Osheske’s complaint without leave to amend, reasoning that
the movie theater’s activities did not qualify as a “rental,
sale, or delivery” of “audio visual materials” under the
VPPA’s definition of “video tape service provider.”
OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION CO. 5
ANALYSIS
I. Video Privacy Protection Act
The dispositive question is whether Landmark, in selling
tickets to in-person film screenings, was “engaged in [a]
business” within reach of the Video Privacy Protection Act.
The original impetus for the VPPA arose during
President Ronald Reagan’s contested nomination of Judge
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, when the Washington
City Paper published a profile of Judge Bork based on a
leaked list of 146 films that he and his family had rented
from a local video store. S. Rep. No. 100-599, at 5 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342. That newspaper
profile, “The Bork Tapes,” was roundly criticized by
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee holding
hearings on Judge Bork’s nomination. Id. at 5–6. In direct
response, the VPPA imposed liability on any “video tape
service provider who knowingly discloses, to any person,
personally identifiable information concerning any
consumer of such provider[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).
Nearly forty years later, we consider for the first time
whether selling tickets to and providing an in-theater movie
experience constitutes a business subject to the VPPA.
The key term, “video tape service provider,” is defined
in the statute as “any person, engaged in the business . . . of
rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes
or similar audio visual materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4)
(emphasis added). Osheske argues that Landmark must be
subject to the statute in part because the movie theater chain
has itself used the verb “deliver” to advertise its “reputation
for delivering the best in specialty, traditional and
independent film” (emphasis added). Landmark counters
that the plain language, structure, and historical context of
6 OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION CO.
the VPPA place movie theaters outside the scope of the Act.
The district court agreed with Landmark. We review de novo
the decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim. Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 15
F.4th 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2021).
We hold under a straightforward construction of the
statutory text that Landmark’s conduct does not make it a
“video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The meaning
of each word in “rental, sale, or delivery” is cabined by the
fact that the sequence enumerates different transactions “of
prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual
materials.” Following that grammatical logic, “rental” and
“sale” clearly refer to the temporary and permanent
exchange of video products, according to standard
definitions in authoritative dictionaries. 1 These readings, in
turn, help us to narrow and sort through the wider-ranging
definitions of “deliver,” 2 since the noscitur a sociis canon of
construction instructs that we “avoid ascribing to one word
a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its
accompanying words[.]” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513
U.S. 561, 575 (1995). We thus read “delivery,” consistent
1
See, e.g., Rental, Oxford English Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/dictionary/rental_n (last visited Feb. 15, 2025)
(defining “rental” as “[t]he fact or process of renting or hiring out
property”); Sale, Oxford English Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/dictionary/sale_n2 (last visited Feb. 15, 2025)
(defining “sale” as “an act of selling or making over to another for a
price; the exchange of a commodity for money or other valuable
consideration”).
2
See Delivery, Oxford English Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/dictionary/delivery_n (last visited Feb. 15, 2025)
(including definitions like “[t]he formal or legal handing of goods over
to another” and “[t]he actual or notional handing over of a deed”).
OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION CO. 7
with “rental” and “sale,” to signify the transfer or
conveyance of a good—i.e., “prerecorded video cassette
tapes or similar audio visual materials.”
Osheske’s argument that Landmark engages in the
“delivery . . . of audio visual materials” by transmitting light
and sound to patrons is unavailing. Taken together, the
phrase “rental, sale, or delivery” characterizes the exchange
of a video product. 3 It does not encompass the provision of
shared access to film screenings. Landmark does not deliver
any “audio visual materials” to the customer in either its
ticket sales or its in-theater experiences. As Landmark’s
counsel laid out, “theater patrons do not obtain the control
over audiovisual materials available to prerecorded video
viewers. Someone late to a theater showing cannot rewind
the movie, someone needing to use the facilities or desiring
a soft drink cannot pause it, and someone falling asleep
cannot stop it and start it again later.” Simply put, there has
not been a transaction involving an exchange of video
materials that qualifies as a “rental, sale, or delivery.”
To the extent that the statutory language leaves any room
for ambiguity, we note that our interpretation also conforms
with the historical context surrounding the VPPA. Outraged
as legislators were about the disclosure of Judge Bork’s
3
Other decisions by our court have left open the possibility that the
temporary or permanent exchange of digital “audio visual materials”
might be subject to the VPPA. See, e.g., Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d
1062, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of VPPA claim
because the defendant streaming service only made the alleged
disclosures to the consumer); Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979,
984–86 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of VPPA claim because
defendant streaming service did not share “personally identifiable
information” under the Act). We need not decide that issue because it is
not presented here.
8 OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION CO.
video rental history, their remarks about privacy and
intellectual freedom were limited to the “home,” the “living
room,” and other contexts in which people might expect
“quiet[] and reflection.” S. Rep. No. 100-599, at 5–7.
Though the market for theatrical releases was in full swing
in the late 1980s, movie theaters were omitted from the Act
and accompanying report, perhaps because they are publicly
accessible sites of shared synchronous viewing. The plain
language of the statute, buttressed by the privacy concerns
animating the VPPA, confirms that Landmark was not
engaged in business subject to the Act.
II. Denial of Leave to Amend
Osheske did not request leave to amend from the district
court, so we need not consider that argument on appeal. But
in the end it doesn’t matter. The district court’s dismissal
without leave to amend was proper because “it is clear, on
de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any
amendment.” Parents for Priv. v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 1221
(9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 894 (2020).
CONCLUSION
We were recently reminded that going to the movies
provides “a communal experience you don’t get at home.” J.
Kim Murphy, “Sean Baker Says Movie Theaters Are ‘Under
Threat’ While Accepting Oscar for Best Director: ‘Keep
Making Films for the Big Screen. I Know I Will’,” Variety,
March 2, 2025, https://variety.com/2025/film/news/sean-
baker-best-director-oscar-anora-1236323071/. It is also
something legally distinct from the “rental, sale, or delivery”
of “audio visual materials” within the meaning of the VPPA.
We affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
Plain English Summary
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PAUL OSHESKE, individually and No.
Key Points
01FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PAUL OSHESKE, individually and No.
02OPINION SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION COMPANY, doing business as Landmark Theaters, Defendant - Appellee.
03SUMMARY * Video Privacy Protection Act Affirming the district court’s dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of an action against Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., doing business as Landmark Theaters, the panel held that the Video Privacy P
04When plaintiff Paul Osheske bought a movie ticket on Landmark’s website, Landmark shared the name of the film, the location of the showing, and Osheske’s unique Facebook identification number with Facebook.
Frequently Asked Questions
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PAUL OSHESKE, individually and No.
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This case was decided on March 27, 2025.
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