Montoya-Campos v. Bondi

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MILADYS LVETH MONTOYA- No. 21-1425 CAMPOS,* Agency No. A206-808-410 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM** PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 12, 2025*** Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. Miladys Lveth Montoya-Campos, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order * The clerk will amend the docket to reflect petitioner’s name as Miladys Lveth Montoya-Campos, consistent with the final removal order in the certified administrative record. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019). We review de novo questions of law and constitutional claims. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Montoya- Campos failed to show she was or would be persecuted on account of a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). We reject as unsupported by the record Montoya-Campos’s contention that the agency improperly imposed a blanket rule that harm from gangs cannot be a valid basis for asylum. Because Montoya-Campos failed to show any nexus to a protected ground, she also failed to satisfy the standard for withholding of removal. See Barajas- Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, Montoya-Campos’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. We need not reach Montoya-Campos’s remaining contentions regarding the 2 21-1425 merits of these claims because lack of nexus is dispositive. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach). Montoya-Campos does not challenge the BIA’s determination that she waived review of the IJ’s denial of CAT protection, so we do not address it. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013). To the extent Montoya-Campos claims ineffective assistance of counsel, this contention is not properly before the court because she did not raise it before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (administrative remedies must be exhausted); see also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19 (2023) (section 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional); Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be raised in a motion to reopen before the BIA). We do not consider the materials Montoya-Campos references in the opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 3 21-1425