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No. 9479200
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Michael Sanders v. Trinity Services Group Incorpo
No. 9479200 · Decided February 28, 2024
No. 9479200·Ninth Circuit · 2024·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
February 28, 2024
Citation
No. 9479200
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
FEB 28 2024
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL MARTIN SANDERS, No. 21-15333
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:18-cv-01471-JAT-DMF
v.
TRINITY SERVICES GROUP MEMORANDUM*
INCORPORATED; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 9, 2024
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: BERZON, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Michael Sanders is an Arizona state prisoner. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action,
he asserts Eighth Amendment violations arising from (1) Order 705 of the Arizona
Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry (“ADCRR”), which
mandates the use of four-point restraints on certain prisoners being treated in non-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1
ADCRR medical facilities, and (2) an allegedly inadequate prison diet. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We have jurisdiction over
Sanders’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. Sanders first raises a procedural argument, contending that the district
court abused its discretion in declining to further extend the deadline to respond to
the defendants’ summary judgment motions. We disagree. The court originally
extended the deadline by 63 days, warning Sanders that it was “not inclined to grant
further extensions.” When Sanders requested an additional 30 days to respond, the
court extended the deadline by another 11 days despite finding that Sanders had not
demonstrated diligence or provided good cause. Sanders nonetheless failed to file
by the extended deadline; indeed, his eventual response would have been untimely
even if the court had granted the additional 30-day extension he requested. For the
same reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Sanders’ late
filings.1
2. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
Charles Ryan, the former ADCRR director, and Chris Moody, the former warden of
the Lewis Prison, on Sanders’ claim that Order 705 violates the Eighth Amendment.
Ryan and Moody are the only defendants named in this claim, and Sanders does not
1
The court nonetheless treated the firsthand allegations in Sanders’ verified
complaint as true when considering the defendants’ summary judgment motions.
2
assert that either official made any specific decisions about the use of restraints
during his hospitalization. Rather, he contends that Order 705 is unconstitutional
because it prevented ADCRR guards from modifying his restraints when he
allegedly experienced painful post-surgery muscle cramps, and that Ryan and
Moody are liable for promulgating and enforcing the Order.
We reject Sanders’ claim. Order 705.10.1.7.1 expressly allows ADCRR
personnel to modify or partially remove a hospitalized inmate’s restraints when a
medical need “is documented by a doctor.” Order 705.10.1.7.1.2 specifies that
“authorization from the Warden or Deputy Warden” is required only if “complete
removal of restraints for a medical need” is requested. The Order is therefore not on
its face “deliberately indifferent” to inmates’ health and safety. See Mendiola-
Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1258 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming a summary
judgment in favor of a county medical center on a prisoner shackling policy that
allowed medical personnel to “ask to have restraints loosened or removed as
necessary”). Sanders was regularly attended to by medical staff, including nurses,
during his four-day hospitalization. No provider documented a medical need for
restraint modification because of muscle cramping, and nurses occasionally adjusted
the restraints to prevent skin irritation and ensure proper blood flow.
3. The cursory allegations in the operative complaint do not plausibly state
a failure-to-train claim against Ryan or Moody. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
3
679 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The
complaint simply asserts that Ryan was generally “responsible for . . . staff hiring,
supervision, deployment, and training,” and that Moody “failed to train his
subordinates” on the “obvious physical condition” exception in the restraint policy.2
There is no assertion that either defendant had anything more than “general
supervisory” authority over training, including any responsibility for creating or
approving training materials or for carrying out training. Coal. to Def. Affirmative
Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n
v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992)).3
4. Finally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on
Sanders’ inadequate nutrition claim. The Eighth Amendment forbids prison
nutrition so inadequate as to amount to “the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting
2
Order 705.10.1.5.3 allows restraints to be modified by ADCRR guards when
an inmate is “obviously injured” or suffers from an “obvious physical condition.”
Ryan and Moody claim that this exception did not apply to Sanders’ alleged muscle
cramps. Their position is consistent with the text of Order 705.10.1.5.3, which
excuses the use of four-point restraints when an inmate has an “obvious physical
condition” such as “contracture of an extremity” or “deformity of an extremity” that
“prevents the application and use of usual restraints.” Although Sanders alleges that
his cramps were “obvious,” he does not assert that his pain “prevented” the
application of restraints.
3
In any event, the failure-to-train allegations focus on the “obvious physical
condition” exception in Order 705.10.1.5.3, which does not appear to apply to
Sanders’ claims. See supra n.2.
4
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Sanders did not allege that the
dietician-approved menu designed by Trinity Services Group fell below that
forgiving standard. In addition, no evidence establishes that any of Sanders’s alleged
medical conditions were caused by his ADCRR diet. To the contrary, medical
records confirm that he has regained nearly all the weight he lost after his hip-
replacement surgery and describe him as “well developed and well nourished.”
AFFIRMED.
5
Plain English Summary
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED FEB 28 2024 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C.
Key Points
01NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED FEB 28 2024 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C.
02COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MICHAEL MARTIN SANDERS, No.
03TRINITY SERVICES GROUP MEMORANDUM* INCORPORATED; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
04Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 9, 2024 Phoenix, Arizona Before: BERZON, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Frequently Asked Questions
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED FEB 28 2024 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C.
FlawCheck shows no negative treatment for Michael Sanders v. Trinity Services Group Incorpo in the current circuit citation data.
This case was decided on February 28, 2024.
Use the citation No. 9479200 and verify it against the official reporter before filing.