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No. 9427549
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Louise Andrich v. Gus Kostas
No. 9427549 · Decided September 21, 2023
No. 9427549·Ninth Circuit · 2023·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
September 21, 2023
Citation
No. 9427549
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LOUISE ANDRICH, an individual, No. 22-16226
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-02212-DWL
and
MEMORANDUM*
MARY GOSS; JESSICA ANDRICH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GUS KOSTAS, Officer, #5854; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
ANGELA HERNANDEZ,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 13, 2023
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: GOULD, HURWITZ, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Louise Andrich (“Plaintiff”) challenges on
appeal a summary judgment in favor of two City of Phoenix police officers and a
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in favor of the City. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and we affirm.
1. The district court correctly found that there was no genuine dispute about
the following material facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
• On June 11, 2018, Phoenix police officers and a Crisis Intervention
Team were called to a Phoenix hotel after Alexandre Andrich,
Plaintiff’s brother, smoked in his room against hotel policy and
slammed his door in the staff’s faces. When the officers arrived at the
hotel, Andrich barricaded himself in the room and refused to leave.
• The next day, Officers Gus Kostas and Brian Peters responded to a call
from the hotel stating that Andrich was trespassing. Peters first
encountered Andrich walking away from the hotel and told him not to
go back. But Andrich returned to the hotel shortly thereafter, and the
two officers were again summoned. They encountered Andrich in the
hotel lobby and followed him into the parking lot, where he ignored
commands to stop.
• When the officers tried to handcuff Andrich, he forcibly resisted,
exhibiting “superhuman strength,” and shaking them off “like rag
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dolls.”
• Although the officers took Andrich to the ground, kicking and
punching him, they were unable to secure handcuffs on both of his
wrists.
• Although the officers subsequently twice used Tasers, they were still
unable to subdue Andrich, who got up and walked away.
• As Kostas pursued him, Andrich manipulated a handcuff that the
officers had only been able to attach to one of his wrists, holding the
protruding metal claw of the open cuff in his hand.
• After Andrich turned toward Kostas, raising the metallic claw, Kostas,
standing ten to twelve feet away, shot and killed him.
2. Given those undisputed facts, the district court did not err in concluding
that Plaintiff had not established that the officers violated a “clearly established”
right and that they therefore were entitled to qualified immunity. See Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). To demonstrate that a right was clearly established,
a plaintiff must “identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances
. . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Sharp v. Cnty. of Orange,
871 F.3d 901, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2017).
a. The primary case that Plaintiff relies upon, Blankenhorn v. City of Orange,
did not involve similar circumstances, as it concerned officers who tackled a
3
cooperating suspect without first attempting to handcuff him. 485 F.3d 463, 478-80
(9th Cir. 2007). Similarly, in another case cited by Plaintiff, the suspect did not resist
arrest. Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir. 2021).
b. The use of Tasers also did not violate clearly established law. In the case
Plaintiff cites, the officer used a Taser against a man who had not physically
threatened the officer while the man was “twenty to twenty-five feet away and not
attempting to flee.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 822, 826-27 (9th Cir.
2010).
c. The shooting, while tragic, also did not violate clearly established law. The
published opinions Plaintiff cites are materially dissimilar to this one. See Curnow
v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991) (decedent “did not point the
gun at the officers and apparently was not facing them when they shot him”); Hayes
v. Cnty. of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2013) (decedent was
complying); S.B. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2017)
(shooting of kneeling decedent by an officer not closest to him); Hughes v. Kisela,
862 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2016) (decedent “did not raise the knife and did not make
any aggressive or threatening actions”), rev’d on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1148
(2018); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1203 (9th Cir. 1997) (decedent “made
no aggressive move of any kind” and was running away from the officer); Newmaker
v. City of Fortuna, 842 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2016) (material fact dispute
4
whether the decedent had threatened the officer before the shooting).
d. Kostas’ failure to warn Andrich before shooting also did not violate clearly
established law. Plaintiff again cites Hayes, but the decedent in that case was
complying with the officer’s directions before being shot. 736 F.3d at 1235.
3. The district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against the City
under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A complaint
asserting Monell liability “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action,
but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to
enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty.
of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). The operative complaint
failed to do so.
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
the Monell claim. “Leave to amend may [] be denied for repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by previous amendment.” Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d
733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff had two prior opportunities to cure the
deficiencies in her Monell claim, and the district court had previously identified the
specific deficiencies in the complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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Plain English Summary
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 21 2023 MOLLY C.
Key Points
01NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 21 2023 MOLLY C.
02COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LOUISE ANDRICH, an individual, No.
032:19-cv-02212-DWL and MEMORANDUM* MARY GOSS; JESSICA ANDRICH, Plaintiffs, v.
04GUS KOSTAS, Officer, #5854; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and ANGELA HERNANDEZ, Defendant.
Frequently Asked Questions
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 21 2023 MOLLY C.
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This case was decided on September 21, 2023.
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