Check how courts have cited this case. Use our free citator for the most current treatment.
No. 10595620
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Dresser v. Bisignano
No. 10595620 · Decided May 30, 2025
No. 10595620·Ninth Circuit · 2025·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
May 30, 2025
Citation
No. 10595620
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2025
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RODERIC J. DRESSER, No. 23-3092
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:23-cv-05083-MLP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 4, 2024**
Portland, Oregon
Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Roderic J. Dresser (“Dresser”) appeals the district court’s order
upholding the denial of his application for social security benefits. We presume
the parties’ familiarity with the facts and discuss them only as necessary for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
context. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order affirming the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision to deny benefits. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788
(9th Cir. 2022). We may set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by
substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d
947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Substantial
evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance” and “is
relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id (citation and quotation
marks omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion
must be upheld.” Id. (citation omitted).
1. The ALJ did not reversibly err in declining to reopen Dresser’s 2013
disability determination. “A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors
that are harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). To
establish reversible error, Dresser must show both error and prejudice. See Ludwig
v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). Assuming without deciding that
Dresser established error, he failed to demonstrate how any error in the ALJ’s
reopening analysis prejudiced him. Dresser has therefore failed to establish
reversible error. Id.
2
2. We turn to the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinions. Because the ALJ
gave significant weight to each medical opinion Dresser identified except for Dr.
Koch’s 2013 opinion, we limit our review to this opinion.1 An ALJ must provide
“specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” for
discrediting a treating or examining doctor’s opinion. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d
1154, 1163 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014). We find the ALJ did so here. Specifically, the
ALJ noted that Dr. Koch’s opinion was largely based on Dresser’s sometimes
unreliable self-reports in conjunction with his finding that Dresser was not
credible. This is sufficient to support the ALJ’s determination. See id. at 1161–62.
3. We look next to the ALJ’s evaluation of Dresser’s testimony. The ALJ
was required to give “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting
Dresser’s testimony by “identify[ing] what testimony is not credible and what
evidence undermines [Dresser’s] complaints.” Id. at 1163 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). The ALJ did so. For example, the ALJ specifically
found that Dresser’s testimony that “if he gets overstressed, or has too much
information thrown at him, he is unable to comprehend tasks at the time, and he
stops functioning mentally,” was inconsistent with his prior work history.
1
Dresser also argues that the ALJ erred in giving significant weight to the
opinions of Dr. Andert, Dr. Comrie, and Dr. Haney. We reject this argument. The
ALJ gave significant weight to these opinions because they were based on reviews
of the available medical evidence and were consistent with the medical record. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3).
3
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Dresser’s testimony because
a reasonable fact finder could conclude Dresser’s testimony was inconsistent with
his prior work experience.
4. Similarly, the ALJ did not err in evaluating lay witness testimony. The
ALJ was entitled to give partial weight to Dresser’s mother’s statements and no
weight to statements from the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation (“DVR”)
so long as he provided reasons germane to them. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc.
Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2008). Again, the ALJ did just that.
For example, the ALJ properly identified Dresser’s mother’s testimony as
inconsistent with the record of Dresser’s activities. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427
F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ likewise provided germane reasons for
rejecting the opinions contained within the DVR report by stating that they were
inconsistent with subsequent medical opinions that were supported by examination
and testing.
5. Dresser’s challenge to the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
determination also fails because he does not identify how it should have been
further limited or why. Dresser argues that the ALJ erred by finding “there were []
full-time competitive jobs [he] could have successfully performed prior to July
2020 on a reasonably continuous basis” because the finding was based on
testimony from the vocational expert (“VE”) that “was made in response to a
4
hypothetical that did not include all of Dresser’s limitations.” However, Dresser
does not identify which limitations the ALJ’s hypothetical supposedly left out or
explain how the ALJ’s hypothetical did not otherwise adequately account for
Dresser’s limitations. Accordingly, we find the ALJ adequately accounted for
Dresser’s limitation in the construction of the RFC and in the hypothetical
presented to the VE. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219,
1228 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
5
Plain English Summary
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2025 MOLLY C.
Key Points
01NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2025 MOLLY C.
02MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
03Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted December 4, 2024** Portland, Oregon Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
04Dresser (“Dresser”) appeals the district court’s order upholding the denial of his application for social security benefits.
Frequently Asked Questions
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2025 MOLLY C.
FlawCheck shows no negative treatment for Dresser v. Bisignano in the current circuit citation data.
This case was decided on May 30, 2025.
Use the citation No. 10595620 and verify it against the official reporter before filing.