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No. 10358118
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Coleman v. Newsom
No. 10358118 · Decided March 19, 2025
No. 10358118·Ninth Circuit · 2025·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
March 19, 2025
Citation
No. 10358118
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RALPH COLEMAN; PETER No. 24-4023
COCKCROFT; ERNESTO
D.C. No.
VENEGAS; JULIO GARZA,
2:90-cv-00520-
KJM-DB
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. OPINION
GAVIN NEWSOM; JEFF
MACOMBER; JOE
STEPHENSHAW; STEPHANIE
CLENDENIN; AMAR MEHTA;
DIANA TOCHE,
Defendants –
Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2024
San Francisco, California
Filed March 19, 2025
2 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
Before: A. WALLACE TASHIMA, JOHNNIE B.
RAWLINSON, and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit
Judges.
Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
SUMMARY **
Prisoner Civil Rights
In an ongoing class action initiated in 1990 by a group of
California state prisoners alleging that the State of California
violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide
constitutionally adequate mental health care in its prisons,
the panel affirmed the district court’s order holding the State
in civil contempt, vacated the district court’s imposition of
fines to the extent they exceeded the State’s monthly salary
savings, and remanded.
In 2017, following years of unsuccessful remedial orders
and ongoing communications with the court-appointed
Special Master, the district court gave the State one last year
to comply with the core requirement that the State bring
health care provider staffing vacancies down to fixed
levels. By 2023, the State had remained far from
compliant. In response, the district court established a
schedule of prospective, conditional fines that would begin
accumulating every month that the State failed to achieve its
staffing obligations. The fines were based on the
**
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 3
approximate salary savings that the State achieved by failing
to fill the required staffing positions. In 2024, after finding
persistent noncompliance, the court issued its final contempt
findings: the state’s noncompliance had resulted in the
accrual of over $110 million in fines.
The panel held that the district court did not err In
holding the State in civil contempt of applicable staffing
orders and in rejecting the State’s substantial compliance
defense and its impossibility defense. The panel further held
that the imposed contempt fines were civil in nature and did
not require criminal due process protection. Nevertheless,
the panel determined that the fines imposed by the district
court were not sufficiently tethered to the record. In
particular, the panel was concerned with the court’s
calculation of the fines based upon a doubling of the State’s
monthly salary savings. Therefore, the panel vacated the
fines to the extent that they exceed the State’s monthly salary
savings, and remanded to the district court for additional
findings and analysis as to the exact amount of fines that
should be imposed.
COUNSEL
Lisa Ells (argued), Alexander Gourse, Ernest Galvan, Maya
E. Campbell, Adrienne P. Harrold, and Michael W. Bien,
Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Randall D. Zack (argued), George R. Morris, and Oliver Wu,
Deputy Attorneys General; Neah Huynh, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General; Monica N. Anderson, Senior
Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta, Attorney General of
California; Office of the California Attorney General, San
4 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
Francisco, California; Elise O. Thorn, Deputy Attorney
General, Office of the California Attorney General,
Sacramento, California; David C. Casarrubias-Gonzalez,
Gary A. Watt, and Rosanna Gan, Hanson Bridgett LLP, San
Francisco, California; for Defendants-Appellants.
OPINION
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
In 1990, a group of California state prisoners filed a
lawsuit alleging that the State of California had violated the
Eighth Amendment by failing to provide constitutionally
adequate mental health care in its prisons. The prisoners,
who later achieved certification as a class action, prevailed
following a bench trial in 1995. The State was adjudged to
be in violation of its Eighth Amendment obligations, and
plans were developed to bring it into compliance. Over three
decades later, however, efforts have stalled, and critical
problems have endured. Despite years of patience by the
judicial system, the class members, and many interested
parties, the State has remained unable to carry out its
constitutional mandate to ensure adequate mental health
services for the thousands of individuals in its care. In the
meantime, the number of state prisoners with serious mental
health needs has substantially increased. The combination
of inadequate mental health care and spiking patient
populations has produced predictably grave results: delays
in access to life-saving care, inadequate medication
management, and a heightened risk of deaths by suicide.
Against this background, the district court initiated
enforcement proceedings. In 2017, following years of
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 5
unsuccessful remedial orders and ongoing communications
with the court-appointed Special Master, the district court
had given the State one last year to come into compliance
with a core component of the court’s remedial program—the
requirement that the State bulk up staffing by bringing
vacancies among designated health care providers down to
fixed levels. But by 2023, the State remained far from
compliant with the court’s orders. In response, the district
court established a schedule of prospective, conditional fines
that would begin accumulating every month that the State
failed to achieve its staffing obligations. After months of
fines accrued, the court oversaw hearings to consider the
propriety of civil contempt sanctions. Finally, in 2024, the
court issued its final contempt findings: The State’s
persistent noncompliance with the court’s orders had
resulted in the accrual of over $110 million in fines, which
the district court expected to be paid.
The State timely appeals from that outcome. As it did
before the district court, the State presents no argument—
and in fact explicitly disclaims—that it actually complied
with the court orders necessary to fulfill its Eighth
Amendment obligations. However, the State contends that
fines are foreclosed by its substantial compliance with
applicable orders, and, in the alternative, by the impossibility
of total compliance. The State further argues that the serious
nature of the district court’s fines elevate its punishment to
the level of criminal, as opposed to civil, contempt. The
State argues that the district court erred by failing to provide
it with commensurate due process protections, such as a jury
trial and factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt.
We reject the State’s arguments. We agree with the
district court that the State failed to satisfy its burden of
proof to present either a substantial compliance defense or
6 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
an impossibility defense. Further, we agree that the nature
of the district court’s fines was civil, not criminal, and that
the district court provided adequate corresponding due
process protections. Nevertheless, we find that the specific
fines imposed by the district court are not sufficiently
tethered to the record. In particular, we are concerned with
the court’s calculation of the fines based upon a doubling of
the State’s monthly salary savings. Therefore, we vacate the
fines only to the extent that they exceed the State’s monthly
salary savings, and we remand for the district court to further
explain its reasons for the exact amount of fines that it
determines to impose.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The origins of this action date back to 1990, when a
group of prisoners filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the State of California (the State). See
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal.
1995). Plaintiffs, who are state prisoners suffering from
serious mental disorders, alleged that the mental health care
provided by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) was so deficient as to deprive them
of their Eighth Amendment right to constitutionally
adequate health care. Id. at 1293, 1297–98. Plaintiffs
brought their claims against a group of state officials, all in
their official capacities, representing the highest levels of
California’s executive branch. Id. at 1293. Those officials
presently include Gavin Newsom, the Governor of
California; Jeff Macomber, the Secretary of CDCR; and
Stephanie Clendenin, the Director of the California
Department of State Hospitals.
Following a bench trial in 1995, the district court
concluded that the State had violated the Eighth Amendment
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 7
by acting with deliberate indifference to the mental health
needs of the plaintiffs, who had, by then, achieved
certification as a class. Id. at 1293, 1319. It determined that
“[t]he constitutional violation which ha[d] been found [wa]s
the product of systemwide deficiencies in the delivery of
mental health care.” Id. at 1324. To remedy those
deficiencies, the district court appointed a Special Master to
help the State plan and implement a constitutionally
adequate mental health care system. Id. The plans on which
the State and the Special Master collaborated were
ultimately compiled into a set of policies and protocols
known as the Mental Health Services Delivery System
Program Guide (the Program Guide). First developed in
1997, and updated on several occasions since then, the
Program Guide has been determined to “represent[] . . . what
is required to remedy the Eighth Amendment violations
identified in this action and to meet [the State’s]
constitutional obligation to deliver adequate mental health
care to seriously mentally ill inmates.” Coleman v. Brown,
938 F. Supp. 2d 955, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2013); Coleman v.
Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1106 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see also
Coleman v. Brown, 756 F. App’x 677, 679 (9th Cir. 2018).
The Program Guide prescribes an extensive framework
for the provision of mental health services of varying levels
and types to class members with varying needs and
manifestations of mental illness. Although this framework
does not expressly regulate staffing, it was soon discovered
that its execution would require the State to drastically
increase its employment of mental health care professionals.
See, e.g., Coleman, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 984–88. To address
that problem, the district court, working in collaboration
with the parties and the Special Master, issued a series of
orders through which it directed the State to bring its
8 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
vacancy rates among designated categories of mental health
care providers down to fixed targets. Most notably, in 1999,
the court ordered the State to reduce its vacancy rate for
psychiatrists to 25 percent and its vacancy rate for
psychiatric social workers to ten percent. Thereafter, in
2002, the court affirmed the ten percent vacancy rate for
psychiatric social workers and further ordered the State to
reduce its vacancy rate for psychiatrists and psychologists to
ten percent.
Despite extensive efforts by all interested parties, these
staffing orders failed to achieve their desired effect. By
2008, the State’s vacancy rate remained in the range of 22 to
36 percent for all mental health care professionals and in the
range of 30 to 54 percent for psychiatrists specifically.
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 934 (E.D.
Cal. 2009). Four years later, the overall vacancy rate still
hovered around 29 percent. Coleman, 938 F. Supp. 2d at
985. In response to these setbacks, the State and the Special
Master worked together to develop new measures to increase
staff recruitment and retention. But by 2017, nearly 20 years
after the district court’s first staffing orders, overall vacancy
rates remained in excess of ten percent, and the vacancy rate
for psychologists and psychiatrists approached 33 percent.
The district court, noting that it “[wa]s past time for
defendants to complete the task of hiring sufficient mental
health staff,” ordered the State to “take all steps necessary to
come into complete compliance with . . . the maximum ten
percent vacancy rate” (the 2017 Order). The court asked that
the State achieve complete compliance by the end of 2018.
But the State did not achieve compliance by the end of
2018. Nor did it do so by the end of 2019, 2020, 2021, or
2022. Finally, in 2023, facing the State’s continued
noncompliance, the district court initiated enforcement
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 9
proceedings (the 2023 Order). It noted that “for twenty years
defendants ha[d] been under court order to maintain []
mental health staffing vacancy rate[s],” and that, despite the
passage of time, the State had never achieved compliance
with the 2017 Order or other past orders. The district court
accordingly set a schedule of prospective fines that would
begin to accumulate on March 31, 2023, and would continue
every month that the State failed to reach the ten percent
vacancy rate set forth in applicable staffing orders. 1 The
fines, which would be based on the approximate salary
savings that the State achieved by failing to fill the required
positions, would not accumulate unless the State failed to
comply for a three-month period. If fines accumulated for
three consecutive months, the district court would
commence contempt proceedings in order to impose
payment.
Even in the face of this threat, the State continued to fail
to address its staffing shortages, and fines began to
accumulate. By the end of 2023, those fines had
accumulated for three consecutive months, and the parties
gathered for evidentiary hearings to consider the propriety of
civil contempt charges. During those proceedings, which
took place over the course of five days, the State did not
dispute that the 2017 Order was enforceable through
contempt or that it had failed to actually comply with the
order. Instead, it argued that it had substantially complied
by taking all reasonable steps to comply and, in any event,
that a nationwide staffing shortage had made actual
1
The 2023 Order specifically ordered the State to achieve a ten percent
vacancy rate with respect to five classifications of mental health care
providers: psychiatric social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists,
recreation therapists, and medical assistants.
10 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
compliance impossible. In support of its defenses, the State
offered the testimony of a labor economist, Dr. Erica
Greulich, and several CDCR employees who spoke to the
agency’s hiring practices. Plaintiffs rebutted this evidence
with the testimony of a health economist, Dr. Timothy
Brown, and additional CDCR employees.
In March 2024, the district court entered tentative
contempt findings but suspended its order for 60 days to
allow the parties to attend mediation. The mediation was
unsuccessful, and the district court thereafter issued its final
contempt findings in June 2024 (the Contempt Order). 2 It
found that the 2017 Order was sufficiently specific and
definite to be enforceable by contempt, and that clear and
convincing evidence established the State’s noncompliance.
The district court further found that the State had not
proffered sufficient evidence to establish its substantial
compliance or impossibility defenses. Finally, the district
court rejected the State’s argument that it was entitled to
heightened due process protections consistent with the
allegedly criminal nature of the contempt fines. Based on
these findings, the district court held three of the named
defendants in contempt and ordered payment, within 30
days, of all accumulated fines.
The State timely appealed. While its appeal was
pending, the State moved for a temporary stay of the
Contempt Order, which we granted.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 103 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1996).
2
On June 27, 2024, the district court issued an updated order in which it
clarified parts of the Contempt Order and changed certain deadlines.
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 11
We review a district court’s civil contempt order for abuse
of discretion. FTC v. EDebitPay, LLC, 695 F.3d 938, 943
(9th Cir. 2012). “[D]eference to the district court’s exercise
of discretion is heightened where,” as here, “the court has
been overseeing a large, public institution for a long period
of time.” Stone v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 968 F.2d
850, 856 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh’g
(Aug. 25, 1992); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688
(1978).
We review a district court’s factual findings in
connection with a contempt order for clear error. Kelly v.
Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016). “The issue
of whether a district court provided an alleged contemnor
due process . . . is a legal question subject to de novo review
on appeal.” Thomas, Head & Greisen Emps. Tr. v. Buster,
95 F.3d 1449, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996).
ANALYSIS
I. The district court did not clearly err by rejecting
the State’s substantial compliance defense.
The State first contends that the district court clearly
erred by rejecting its substantial compliance defense.
“[S]ubstantial compliance with a court order is a defense to
an action for civil contempt.” Gen. Signal Corp. v.
Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Vertex Distrib., Inc. v. Falcon Foam Plastics, Inc., 689 F.2d
885, 891–92 (9th Cir. 1982). This defense is available to an
alleged contemnor that has “taken ‘all reasonable steps’ to
comply” with applicable court orders, resulting in merely
“technical or inadvertant [sic] violations” of those orders.
Gen. Signal Corp., 787 F.2d at 1379; see also Lab./Cmty.
Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 564 F.3d
1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009). In other words, the substantial
12 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
compliance defense excuses an alleged contemnor who,
despite not achieving total compliance, has achieved near-
total compliance through the exhaustion of all reasonable
efforts. In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust
Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993). A party that raises
this defense bears the burden of establishing its applicability.
Stone, 968 F.2d at 856 n.9.
The district court found that the State failed to show
substantial compliance with the 2017 Order because it did
not take all reasonable steps available to comply and did not
come close to actual compliance. To assess whether the
district court clearly erred in making this finding, we must
answer two questions. First, what were the obligations with
which the State was required to comply? Second, did the
State substantially comply with those obligations by taking
all reasonable steps to comply, leaving only “technical or
inadvertent” violations? See In re Dual-Deck Video, 10 F.3d
at 695 (substantial compliance with a court order “is not
vitiated by ‘a few technical violations’ where every
reasonable effort has been made to comply” (quoting Vertex
Distrib., 689 F.2d at 891)).
a. The 2017 Order set a ten percent vacancy rate.
The first step necessary to assess the State’s substantial
compliance defense is to identify the obligations with which
the State was required to comply. The State argues that the
“plain text of the underlying orders establish that Defendants
were required to achieve a 10% vacancy rate for each of the
five classifications at issue”: psychiatrists, psychologists,
psychiatric social workers, recreation therapists, and
medical assistants. We agree. The ten percent vacancy rate
was first introduced in 1999, when the district court ordered
the State to reduce the vacancy rate for psychiatric social
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 13
workers to ten percent, and was cemented in 2002, when the
district court extended the ten percent vacancy rate to
psychologists and psychiatrists. Fifteen years later, in the
2017 Order, the district court confirmed these figures by
ordering the State to “come into complete compliance with
the . . . [2002 order’s] maximum ten percent vacancy rate.”
This was the vacancy rate that the State was again ordered to
achieve in the 2023 Order, on which the contempt fines are
premised. 3
The State nevertheless contends that the district court
moved the goalposts in the Contempt Order by insisting
upon a perfect zero vacancy rate, such that the State was
required to achieve a ten percent vacancy rate merely to
establish substantial compliance. This argument fails. The
Contempt Order repeatedly confirmed that the benchmark
for actual compliance was “a ten percent vacancy rate
systemwide in [all] of the five classifications at issue.” It
also confirmed that “100 percent compliance with the
maximum ten percent vacancy rate [was] the starting point[]
for the court’s assessment of whether defendants [we]re in
substantial compliance.” These statements reflect no
expectation that the State surpass the ten percent vacancy
rate set forth in the 2017 Order. Instead, consistent with the
nature of the substantial compliance defense, they establish
a framework for assessing whether, why, and to what extent
the State failed to achieve actual compliance with the ten
percent vacancy rate based on its pursuit of all reasonable
efforts to comply. Gen. Signal Corp., 787 F.2d at 1379; see
3
An addendum to the 2023 Order clarified that the ten percent rate was
applicable to all five classifications of mental health care employees,
including medical assistants and recreation therapists.
14 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
also Lab./Cmty. Strategy Ctr., 564 F.3d at 1122. This
framework was not erroneous.
b. The State did not substantially comply with the
ten percent vacancy rate.
The next step necessary to assess the State’s substantial
compliance defense is to evaluate whether the State took “all
reasonable steps” to achieve the ten percent vacancy rate,
such that its failure to do so was merely “technical or
inadvertant [sic].” Gen. Signal Corp., 787 F.2d at 1379. The
district court found that the State failed to satisfy these two
requirements because it failed to take all reasonable steps to
achieve a ten percent vacancy rate and because its
noncompliance was not “technical or inadvertent” but,
instead, “serious and consequential, negatively so.” We
discern no clear error in either of these findings.
i. The State did not take all reasonable steps to
comply.
The district court did not clearly err by finding that the
State failed to take all reasonable steps to comply with the
2017 Order. In support of its defense, the State offered the
testimony of Dr. Greulich and CDCR employees who spoke
to various efforts the State had pursued to lower vacancy
rates and generally improve patient outcomes. These efforts
included expanding the State’s telepsychiatry program;
launching a new telehealth program focused on
psychologists and social workers; participating in new hiring
events; conducting a system-wide analysis of procedures and
protocols; and raising salaries for mental health providers.
As the district court noted, this evidence reflected that
the State took many steps to pursue compliance with the ten
percent vacancy rate. “But merely taking significant steps
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 15
toward implementing [a] decree falls far short of ‘substantial
compliance.’” Rouser v. White, 825 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th
Cir. 2016). Instead, to establish this defense, a contemnor
bears the heavier burden of showing that it took “all
reasonable steps to comply” with court orders. Kelly, 822
F.3d at 1096; Stone, 968 F.2d at 856 n.9. The State did not
make this showing because it neglected to pursue certain
reasonable steps that were available to it.
One of the reasonable steps available to the State
pertained to the working conditions of its mental health staff.
In a 2020 report, the Special Master observed low retention
rates and high rates of job dissatisfaction among on-site
providers due to concerns about office spaces and
employment conditions. The Special Master suggested that
the State direct its attention toward these issues. However,
during the district court’s contempt hearings, CDCR
clinicians testified that serious problems persisted. These
clinicians explained that staff were frustrated with—and
frequently vacated their positions due to—their workloads,
which were high and accompanied by egregious paperwork
demands; their security protections, which were perceived as
insufficient; their lack of support, both clinically and
administratively; and their physical workspaces, which often
took the form of windowless converted cells in old and
unheated prisons. The State did not rebut this evidence or
present any reason that it could not pursue reasonable steps
to ameliorate the identified problems. Further, when the
State’s primary expert, Dr. Greulich, was asked about staff
working conditions, she opined that she was not only
unfamiliar with those conditions but had no “opinion on how
CDCR’s working conditions could be improved to fill
vacancies.”
16 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
Other reasonable steps were also available to the State.
In connection with the contempt hearings, Plaintiffs
introduced evidence of logistical defects in the State’s
recruitment efforts, such as delays in contacting job
applicants that were leading to the loss of eligible candidates
before they were even offered interviews. Plaintiffs also
introduced evidence that providers were unhappy with the
lack of pension reform and clamoring for further telehealth
offerings. This evidence, which highlighted tangible gaps in
the State’s hiring and recruitment processes, demonstrated
the availability of additional reasonable steps that the State
could pursue to reduce vacancies. But the State mounted no
meaningful rebuttal to this evidence other than to point to
other reasonable steps it had pursued. Because the State bore
the burden of showing not that it pursued some reasonable
steps, but all reasonable steps, the district court did not
clearly err by finding that the State failed to establish this
element of its substantial compliance defense. Stone, 968
F.2d at 856 n.9; see also Rouser, 825 F.3d at 1082 (“While
[substantial compliance] is not amenable to a
‘mathematically precise definition,’ . . . merely taking
significant steps toward compliance comes nowhere near
satisfying this exacting standard.” (quoting Jeff D. v. Otter,
643 F.3d 278, 284 (9th Cir. 2011))).
In opposition to this conclusion, the State criticizes the
district court for numerous perceived errors in its assessment
of the evidence and its commentary about other reasonable
steps the State might have pursued. Some of these criticisms
are valid. However, they do not bear on the reasonableness
of the above-mentioned steps that the State could have
pursued to achieve compliance with the target vacancy rates.
For example, although the State asserts that the district court
misstated elements of Dr. Greulich’s testimony, her
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 17
positions played no role in the district court’s findings that
the State might reasonably have addressed its staffing
challenges by ameliorating working conditions, reducing
bottlenecks in recruitment, or expanding its telehealth
program. Therefore, to the extent that the district court
misstated Dr. Greulich’s testimony or engaged in other
similar inaccuracies, any such errors are harmless and
illustrate no clear error in the district court’s overall findings.
See Kelly, 822 F.3d at 1096 (“A contemnor in violation of a
court order may avoid a finding of civil contempt only by
showing it took all reasonable steps to comply.”).
ii. The State’s violations were not “technical or
inadvertent.”
The district court also did not clearly err by finding that
the State’s violations of the 2017 Order were not “technical
or inadvertent.” As noted, actual compliance required the
State to reduce its vacancy rates for all five classifications of
mental health care professionals to ten percent or less. But
the State did not come close to achieving these numbers.
During the 14 months preceding the Contempt Order, the
State oversaw adequate staffing with respect to psychiatrists
and recreation therapists, with the vacancy rate ranging
between 6 and 15 percent for the former group and between
8 and 15 percent for the latter. By the State’s own admission,
however, this period saw the vacancy rate for social workers
range between 17 and 29 percent and the vacancy rate for
medical assistants range between 14 and 43 percent. Most
troublingly, during the 14-month period preceding the
Contempt Order, the State’s vacancy rate for psychologists
never fell below 35 percent. As the district court properly
found, these numbers did not reflect technical or inadvertent
compliance with the 2017 Order. Instead, they reflected
serious and significant shortcomings in meeting the target
18 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
vacancy rates that the State had been under order to achieve
for two decades.
Further, as the district court correctly reasoned, this
noncompliance by the State was not only not technical in
nature but “serious and consequential” in effect. CDCR
staffing does not occur in a vacuum. Instead, it directly
impacts patient outcomes by shaping whether prisoners with
serious mental health needs are afforded opportunities to
access essential, even lifesaving, care. During the contempt
hearings, Plaintiffs illustrated this causal pathway through
evidence that recent staffing shortages had caused self-harm
incidents to spike, severed existing pathways for care, and
generally placed class members at a “grave and unacceptable
risk of harm.” Due to these extreme impacts, the State’s
vacancy rates, both in principle and practice, well exceeded
the bounds of substantial compliance. See Lab./Cmty.
Strategy Ctr., 564 F.3d at 1122 (“Our analysis requires we
do more than simply count the number of technical
deviations from the decree. Instead, we must determine,
using a holistic view of all the available information,
whether [the alleged contemnor’s] compliance with the
Decree overall was substantial.”).
II. The district court did not clearly err by rejecting
the State’s impossibility defense.
The State next contends that the district court clearly
erred by rejecting its impossibility defense. “Inability to
comply with an order is . . . a complete defense to a charge
of contempt.” United States v. Asay, 614 F.2d 655, 660 (9th
Cir. 1980); see also Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 442
(2011). “It is settled, however, that in raising this defense,
the [noncomplying party] has a burden of production.”
United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983).
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 19
Specifically, “the party asserting the impossibility defense
must show ‘categorically and in detail’ why he is unable to
comply.” FTC v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1241
(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting NLRB v. Trans Ocean Export
Packing, Inc., 473 F.2d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 1973)). “If the
record establishes that there in fact is a present inability to
comply with a[n] [] order, the ‘civil [contempt] inquiry is at
an end.’” Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702
F.2d 770, 781 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Maggio v. Zeitz, 333
U.S. 56, 74 (1948)).
The district court did not clearly err by finding that the
State failed to establish an impossibility defense. The State
had specifically argued that compliance was impossible
because of a nationwide staffing shortage that had
circumscribed its ability to hire mental health care providers.
In support of this argument, the State relied on the report and
testimony of its labor economist, Dr. Greulich. Dr. Greulich
explained the existence and impact of the staffing shortage,
and she asserted that it had left the State with difficult
challenges in hiring. For example, Dr. Greulich opined that,
due to the shortage of available mental health care
professionals, the State was unlikely to “meaningfully
increase filled positions for the classifications at issue”
merely by offering higher salaries or attempting to outbid
competing employers. Dr. Greulich further opined that
“[r]emaining proposed solutions” that might aid the State in
its hiring efforts were “largely outside of CDCR’s control.”
Despite these statements, Dr. Greulich did not claim that
the State could not achieve its court-ordered vacancy rates.
Although she opined that certain solutions were unavailable
to the State or of limited value in helping it to meet its
targets, she acknowledged, for example, that telehealth was
“one avenue that enhance[d] CDCR’s ability to achieve its
20 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
vacancy goals.” Dr. Greulich offered no opinion that the
State had exhausted this or other potential efforts to boost its
hiring. Further, when asked expressly whether she was
“offering the opinion that it’s impossible for CDCR to hire
psychologists,” Dr. Greulich clarified that she was “not
offering that opinion.” Dr. Greulich offered similar answers
when asked whether she was opining on whether it was
impossible for the State to hire sufficient social workers and
medical assistants. 4 Beyond Dr. Greulich, no other defense
witness testified, opined, or purported to demonstrate that
compliance with the 2017 Order was impossible.
As the district court reasonably found, this evidence
showed that it would be “difficult or expensive” for the State
to fill the positions necessary to achieve a ten percent
vacancy rate. However, once again, the State’s burden was
not to show that compliance would be difficult or expensive.
Instead, it carried the heavier burden of establishing that
compliance was “factually impossible.” Rylander, 460 U.S.
at 757. The district court did not clearly err by concluding
that the State had not made that showing where it failed to
adduce evidence of impossibility or rebut clearly meaningful
pathways that could potentially bring it into compliance.
The district court was particularly well-equipped to reach
that conclusion due to its ongoing involvement with the case
since 1990, and its “overs[ight] [over] the implementation of
the [case] for [over] a decade.” See Stone, 968 F.2d at 856.
That close involvement provided the district court with a
unique ability to examine whether the State’s obligations
were impossible to achieve. See id.
4
As previously noted, it is undisputed that the State functionally met the
ten percent vacancy rate with respect to the two other classifications of
employees—recreation therapists and psychiatrists.
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 21
The State presents two counterarguments to this
conclusion, but neither is persuasive. First, the State
contends that the district court clearly erred in its decision-
making process because it ignored evidence that CDCR is
subject to unique hiring challenges and that California’s
statewide staffing shortage will only worsen in coming
years. But no evidence was adduced by the State to show
that these circumstances would entirely prevent it from
conducting increased hiring, particularly on the relatively
minor scale that would be necessary for the State to achieve
its target vacancy rates. 5 Therefore, this argument highlights
no clear error in the district court’s factfinding or analysis.
Second, the State attempts to shift the standard by
suggesting that “‘[i]mpossibility’ for the purposes of
contempt ‘does not mean that compliance must be totally’ or
‘strictly impossible.’” Relying on Chairs v. Burgess, 143
F.3d 1432 (11th Cir. 1998), the State argues that the
impossibility standard is instead satisfied by a showing that
the noncomplying party has exercised all reasonable efforts
to comply with court orders. This argument amounts to an
attempt to replicate the substantial compliance standard. For
the reasons previously discussed, because the State did not
exercise all reasonable efforts to comply, that standard is not
satisfied here.
In any event, Chairs does not shift the standard
applicable to the State’s impossibility defense. As a
threshold matter, it was arguably overturned by Turner, in
which the Supreme Court cabined the impossibility defense
5
At the time of Dr. Greulich’s deposition, Plaintiffs introduced evidence
that the State could achieve a ten percent vacancy rate, at least with
respect to medical assistants and social workers, by hiring 18 and 63 of
each group, respectively.
22 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
not to all instances of reasonable behavior but, instead, only
to instances in which “the alleged contemnor is unable to
comply with the terms of the order.” Turner, 564 U.S. at 442
(emphasis added) (quoting Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock,
485 U.S. 624, 638 n.9 (1988)); see also Rylander, 460 U.S.
at 757 (impossibility defense is available where “compliance
is [] factually impossible”). Even if it did not, Chairs is not
the governing law in this circuit, where we have repeatedly
emphasized that the impossibility defense arises only from
literal impossibility that disables the alleged contemnor from
complying with the court’s orders. See Asay, 614 F.2d at
660 (impossibility defense turns on “[i]nability to comply
with an order”); Falstaff Brewing Corp., 702 F.2d at 781–82
(same); see, e.g., Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1241
(rejecting impossibility defense where compliance “was
possible” and “not impossible”); Hook v. Dep’t of Corr., 107
F.3d 1397, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of
reh’g and reh’g en banc (Apr. 22, 1997) (rejecting
impossibility defense where “compliance was not physically
impossible”). For that additional reason, Chairs does not
control our analysis.
III. The district court provided adequate due process
protections.
Finally, the State contends that the district court erred
because it imposed fines that were criminal in nature without
providing commensurate due process protections. 6 In
response, Plaintiffs concede that, although criminal due
6
As previously noted, whereas we review for clear error a district court’s
factual findings in connection with a civil contempt order, EDebitPay,
695 F.3d at 943, we review de novo whether a district court provided an
alleged contemnor due process, Thomas, Head & Greisen Emps. Tr., 95
F.3d at 1458.
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 23
process protections were not observed, the fines that were
imposed were functionally civil. Thus, the parties’ dispute
turns on whether the district court’s fines were criminal or
civil in essence.
The Contempt Order nominally purported to impose
civil sanctions. However, “the label affixed to a contempt”
is not by itself “determinative.” Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 838 (1994).
Instead, “[t]o determine whether contempt sanctions are civil
or criminal, we examine ‘the character of the relief itself.’”
Parsons v. Ryan, 949 F.3d 443, 455 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828). A “sanction generally is civil if
it coerces compliance with a court order.” Ahearn ex rel.
NLRB v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Locs. 21 & 4,
721 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). “A criminal sanction,
in contrast, generally seeks to punish a ‘completed act of
disobedience.’” Id. (quoting Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828). The
distinction is material because criminal sanctions require
greater due process, including a jury trial and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826–27; see also
F.J. Hanshaw Ents., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244
F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001).
The State presents three reasons that the fines imposed
by the district court here were criminal, as opposed to civil.
Because we are not persuaded by these reasons, we agree
with Plaintiffs that the fines were civil, and we affirm the
district court’s refusal to provide criminal due process
protections.
a. The fines were purgeable.
The State first contends that the fines imposed were
criminal, not civil, because it was afforded no opportunity to
purge, i.e., “reduce or avoid the fine[s] through compliance.”
24 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829. Generally speaking, “the
imposition of non-compliance fines following a failure to
purge is a coercive, civil remedy.” NLRB v. Ironworkers
Loc. 433, 169 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1999); Bagwell, 512
U.S. at 828–29. Thus, “the ability to purge is perhaps the
most definitive characteristic of coercive civil contempt.”
Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 815 F.3d 623, 629
(9th Cir. 2016); see also Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d
1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).
Bagwell explained the relevance of purging through an
analogy to the dichotomy between civil and criminal
imprisonment. 512 U.S. at 828–30; see Lasar, 399 F.3d at
1110. Just as “a fixed sentence of imprisonment is punitive
and criminal if it is imposed retrospectively for a ‘completed
act of disobedience,’” a non-purgeable criminal fine is one
that is “fixed, determinate, [and] retrospective,” providing
the alleged contemnor no ability to avoid its imposition.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828, 837 (quoting Gompers v. Buck’s
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1911)). In contrast,
just as a conditional sentence of imprisonment is coercive
and civil if the contemnor “carries the keys of his prison in
his own pocket,” a purgeable civil fine is one that is forward-
looking and conditional, allowing the contemnor to avoid its
imposition by altering some behavior. Id. at 828 (quoting
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442). As Bagwell explained, falling
into the latter camp is “a per diem fine imposed for each day
a contemnor fails to comply with an affirmative court order.”
Id. at 829. Such a fine is fundamentally coercive and civil
because, so long as “the jural command is obeyed, the future,
indefinite, daily fines are purged.” Id.; see also Shell
Offshore Inc., 815 F.3d at 629–30.
The sanctions imposed here were purgeable for the same
reason. Like a per diem fine imposed for future
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 25
noncompliance, the fines were the result of a forward-
looking, conditional schedule that would impose fines only
in “each [month] [the State] fail[ed] to comply with” the
2017 Order. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829. That schedule did
not take effect until March 31, 2023—one month after the
district court gave notice about the fee schedule on February
28, 2023—and, even then, fines did not begin to accrue until
the State passed three months in noncompliance. As a result,
as of the day the fine schedule was established, the State had
four months to “reduce or avoid the fine[s] through
compliance,” and even more months to avoid successive
monthly charges. Id. Like the civil contemnor imprisoned
with the “keys of his prison in his own pocket,” the State had
full power to circumvent the sanctions it now faces. Id. at
828 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442); see also Parsons,
949 F.3d at 456 (“Prospective, conditional fine schedules do
not bear any of the hallmarks of punitive contempt, such as
retroactivity and determinacy.”); NLRB, 169 F.3d at 1221.
The State nevertheless insists that the fines were not
purgeable because, once imposed, the State had no
opportunity to “avoid or reduce the fines” by “subsequently
comply[ing] with the 10% vacancy rate.” But this argument
misreads Bagwell. So long as a contemnor has an initial
opportunity to reduce or avoid the initial imposition of a fine,
the contemnor need not be afforded a second, subsequent
opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine that was already
imposed. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828–30. In other words,
“fines imposed without further opportunity to purge are not
punitive when those fines are prompted by a party’s previous
failure to purge.” NLRB, 169 F.3d at 1221. A contrary
result, as Plaintiffs observe, would be nonsensical: “Were it
otherwise, compliance with laws or orders could never be
brought about by fines in civil contempt proceedings.”
26 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
Hoffman ex rel. NLRB v. Beer Drivers & Salesmen’s Loc.
Union No. 888, 536 F.2d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1976).
b. The fines were not punitive.
The State next contends that the fines imposed were
criminal in effect because they were based on “out-of-court
violations of a complex injunction.” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at
837. This argument finds support from Bagwell, which
observed that “[c]ontempts involving out-of-court
disobedience to complex injunctions often require elaborate
and reliable factfinding.” Id. at 833–34. But Bagwell
expressly “le[ft] unaltered the longstanding authority of
judges . . . to enter broad compensatory awards for all
contempts through civil proceedings.” Id. at 838. Pursuant
to that principle, we have held that “[a]lthough the ‘line
between civil and criminal contempt’ can become ‘blurred’
in cases where ‘noncompensatory sanctions’ are predicated
on ‘out-of-court disobedience to complex injunctions,’ no
such blurriness exists” where the sanctions that are entered
are compensatory in nature. Parsons, 949 F.3d at 456
(quoting Ahearn, 721 F.3d at 1129).
Parsons concluded that a district court’s contempt
sanctions were compensatory because they would be used
“for the benefit of the class ‘to further compliance’” with the
court’s orders. Id. Here, too, the district court imposed fines
to “ensure the constitutional rights of members of the
plaintiff class [we]re honored and protected.” The district
court crafted the fines to effectuate that outcome in two
ways. First, the district court designed the fine schedule to
disincentivize the State’s noncompliance by eliminating the
savings it achieved by leaving positions vacant. Second, like
in Parsons, the district court ordered the parties to employ
the funds to class members’ benefit. Id. The spending plan
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 27
to which the parties ultimately stipulated will see the State
direct the sanctioned funds toward hiring and recruitment
measures that will directly improve staffing and, by
extension, patient outcomes. In this way, the district court’s
fines are remedially focused on returning benefits for the
class. See id.; see also Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632 (“If the relief
provided is a fine, it is remedial when it is paid to the
complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court.”);
Shell Offshore, 815 F.3d at 629 n.4 (“Whether fines are
payable to the opposing party or to the court may also be a
factor in deciding whether they are coercive or
compensatory.”).
c. The fines were serious.
Finally, the State contends that the fines imposed were
criminal in effect because their substantial size renders them
“serious.” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837. In Bagwell, the
Supreme Court concluded that fines in excess of $52 million
were serious. Id. Similarly, in F.J. Hanshaw Enterprises,
our court concluded that a $500,000 fine was serious. 244
F.3d at 1139 & n.10. Under those precedents, and a
commonsense understanding of the term “serious,” see
Serious, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/serious (last visited Oct. 6, 2023)
(defining “serious” as “excessive or impressive in quality,
quantity, extent, or degree”), the conclusion that that the
district court’s $111 million fine here is “serious” cannot be
avoided.
Even so, that a fine is serious does not necessitate the
conclusion that it is criminal. To the contrary, Bagwell
considered the “seriousness” of the lower court’s fine only
in connection with its holding that, while all criminal
sanctions require heightened due process protections, “the
28 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
right to trial by jury applies only to serious criminal
sanctions.” 512 U.S. at 837 n.5, 838–39. F.J. Hanshaw
Enterprises, which also considered the seriousness of a
criminal fine, likewise focused its analysis on the principle
that “before serious criminal penalties can be imposed . . . ,
the contemnor must be afforded the full protection of a
criminal jury trial.” 244 F.3d at 1138. These precedents
suggest not that the seriousness of a fine affects whether it is
criminal but, instead, that the seriousness of a criminal fine
affects what due process protections are required. As a
result, these precedents do not disrupt our conclusion that the
district court’s fine here, although so large in size as to be
“certainly serious,” was ultimately civil due to its
compensatory nature and the availability of purging. See
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829 (“Where a fine is not
compensatory, it is civil only if the contemnor is afforded an
opportunity to purge.”).
IV. The district court did not sufficiently explain its
calculations.
Although the seriousness of the district court’s fines does
not draw them into the category of criminal contempt, it
draws our attention to a separate issue that the parties did not
raise on appeal. Specifically, we note that, “in fixing the
amount of a fine to be imposed . . . as a means of securing
future compliance,” courts must “consider the amount of
[the] defendant’s financial resources and the consequent
seriousness of the burden to that particular defendant.”
United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258,
304 (1947). For example, courts must consider “the
character and magnitude of the harm threatened by
continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any
suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired.” Id.
Here, although the district court imposed serious and
COLEMAN V. NEWSOM 29
substantial fines that ultimately exceeded $110 million, it
neglected to provide a “reasoned consideration” of all of
these criteria. Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141,
1148 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Parsons, 949 F.3d at 457.
In particular, we note concern with the district court’s
lack of explanation or factfinding regarding the size of its
fines. As noted, the fines are based on the average monthly
salary for each unfilled position that the State would need to
fill to reach a ten percent vacancy rate. That basic
construction is reasonable and can be understood as an
attempt to shift the State’s incentives by eliminating the
savings it achieves through noncompliance. However, the
choice to increase the fines to double the amount of the
State’s monthly salary “savings” is a decision that is not as
easily understood. As Plaintiffs suggest, it can be inferred
that the district court set the fines at this level to eliminate
the State’s additional savings on items such as health
insurance and retirement contributions. But the district court
offered no such explanation for its calculations, and it made
no findings or estimates about the extent of such potential
savings by the State. In the absence of such details, we
cannot conclude that the portion of the fines exceeding the
State’s monthly salary savings is calculated with the
necessary level of precision. See Spallone v. United States,
493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990). Further factfinding and analysis
are necessary to ensure that this portion of the fine is
optimally calculated so as to deter noncompliance without
imposing an excessive penalty.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court did not err or clearly
err in holding the State in civil contempt of applicable
staffing orders. We agree that the State did not excuse its
30 COLEMAN V. NEWSOM
noncompliance through the establishment of a successful
substantial compliance or impossibility defense. Further, we
conclude that the contempt fines that were imposed were
civil in nature and did not require criminal due process
protections. Nevertheless, we express concern with the lack
of explanation surrounding the district court’s calculation of
the fines. Because the calculation and analysis employed by
the court is not sufficiently set forth in the record, we vacate
the fines to the extent that they exceed the State’s monthly
salary savings, and we remand to the district court for
additional findings and analysis as to the exact amount of
fines that should be imposed.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and
REMANDED.
Costs are to be taxed against the appellants.
Plain English Summary
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RALPH COLEMAN; PETER No.
Key Points
01FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RALPH COLEMAN; PETER No.
02VENEGAS; JULIO GARZA, 2:90-cv-00520- KJM-DB Plaintiffs - Appellees, v.
03OPINION GAVIN NEWSOM; JEFF MACOMBER; JOE STEPHENSHAW; STEPHANIE CLENDENIN; AMAR MEHTA; DIANA TOCHE, Defendants – Appellants.
04Mueller, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted December 6, 2024 San Francisco, California Filed March 19, 2025 2 COLEMAN V.
Frequently Asked Questions
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RALPH COLEMAN; PETER No.
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