Brooks-Joseph v. City of Seattle

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TERRI BROOKS-JOSEPH, No. 24-2735 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:22-cv-01078-RSL v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF SEATTLE; LOURDES PODWALL; SUSAN DAVIDSON; BRITT LUZZI; SHARON HUNTER; SEATTLE CITY LIGHT, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 15, 2025** Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. Terri Brooks-Joseph appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging federal and state claims of employment * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). discrimination, whistleblower retaliation, wrongful discharge, and negligent retention and supervision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2025). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Brooks-Joseph’s employment discrimination claims because Brooks-Joseph failed to establish a prima facie case under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See id. at 802 (setting forth requirements of a prima facie case). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Brooks-Joseph’s whistleblower retaliation claims because Brooks-Joseph failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she is a state employee for purposes of state law or whether she filed a written complaint for purposes of the local municipal code. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 42.40.020(2), 42.40.050(1)(a) (Washington Whistleblower Protection Act, applying to state employees); Wash. Rev. Code § 42.41.050 (granting local governments the authority to promulgate their own whistleblower-protection processes); Seattle Municipal Code §§ 4.20.860, 4.20.870 (requiring a local government employee alleging whistleblower retaliation to file a written complaint within 180 days with the Executive Director of the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission). Brooks-Joseph’s contention that the district court suppressed and 2 24-2735 disregarded evidence is unsupported by the record. All pending motions are denied. AFFIRMED. 3 24-2735