Check how courts have cited this case. Use our free citator for the most current treatment.
No. 9450960
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Anqin Wang v. Fang Zeng
No. 9450960 · Decided December 11, 2023
No. 9450960·Ninth Circuit · 2023·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
December 11, 2023
Citation
No. 9450960
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANQIN WANG, No. 22-56141
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-08936-MWF-
RAO
v.
FANG ZENG, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 7, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Fang Zeng appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to vacate the
court’s entry of default and default judgment against her under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review the denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)
de novo, but we review the district court’s factual findings about jurisdiction for
clear error. SEC v. Internet Sols. for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007);
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
Rule 60(b)(4) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment
if that judgment is void. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). And the Ninth Circuit has long
held that a judgment is void if it was entered against a defendant over whom the
court lacked personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist.
No. 1, 824 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2016). Assuming the Rule 60(b)(4) motion
was timely, we turn to whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over Zeng
when it entered judgment against her.
1. Wang’s service of process on Zeng was proper. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permit service of process in accordance with state law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(e)(1). And California allows service by publication if the party to be served cannot
“with reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified in this article.”
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.50(a). To effect proper service by publication, notice
must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” In re Emily R., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1344, 1351 (2000) (internal quotations
omitted).
2 22-56141
Wang exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to serve Zeng before
requesting service by publication. The district court noted that, in an attempt to serve
Zeng with process, Wang’s private investigator searched California’s official
databases, county clerks’ filings, court dockets, and social media, as well as traveled
to Zeng’s various properties in California. Wang also served Victoria Chan, one of
the defendants and the daughter-in-law of Zeng, with process for both herself and
Zeng, at which point Chan received the papers and said “okay.” Zeng retorts that
service was improper because she was residing in China, not California. But Zeng’s
cited cases, In re D.R., 39 Cal. App. 5th 583, 591 (2019) and Lebel v. Mai, 210 Cal.
App. 4th 1154, 1164 (2012), hold that service is improper when a plaintiff knows
that the defendant resides in another country. The record makes clear that, upon
Wang’s reasonable belief, Zeng resided and could be served in California.1
And Wang’s service by publication was reasonably calculated to give Zeng
notice. The summons was printed in the Los Angeles Times, one of the most widely
circulated newspapers in California, four times over two months. And while the
1
Zeng was the chairwoman of the California Immigrant Investment Fund,
an entity which was incorporated in California and has its principal place of
business in Los Angeles. Zeng also obtained mortgages on her Arcadia property in
2011 and 2016 which indicate her agreement to occupy the property as her
principal residence and which designate it as her mailing address, respectively.
That a deed of trust from 2011 lists a Chinese address, and that Wang once met
Zeng in an office in China in 2016, are insufficient to show that Wang knew Zeng
resided in China.
3 22-56141
case number was misprinted, the publication did not reference a completely
unrelated case. It contained Zeng’s name, and the case number referred to another
lawsuit before the Central District of California in which Zeng is a party. The district
court correctly “[found] it implausible that a defendant, seeing their name in a
published notice, would look up the case number, find that the case number is for a
different action that also names the same defendant, and then deem themselves
absolved of knowledge of either lawsuit – especially when the plaintiff has already
attempted service in several other manners.”
2. Zeng’s argument that the Hague Convention on Service should have
applied also fails. “Where service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under
both state law and under the Due Process clause, our inquiry ends and the [Hague]
Convention has no further implications.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707 (1988). As shown above, service of process was valid
under California law. And service was valid under the Due Process clause because
it was “reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” United Student
Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 261 (2010) (quoting Mullane v. Central
4 22-56141
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).2 The district court did not
err by determining that the Hague Convention on Service did not apply.
Because we find that service of process was proper, we do not reach whether
Zeng consented to personal jurisdiction in California. The district court had personal
jurisdiction over Zeng when the judgment was entered. The judgment is not void.
AFFIRMED.
2
The district court noted the extensive surveillance and searches by Wang’s
retained investigator and counsel, as well as their visits to several addresses in an
effort to effect service on Zeng.
5 22-56141
Plain English Summary
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2023 MOLLY C.
Key Points
01NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2023 MOLLY C.
02Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 7, 2023** Pasadena, California Before: WARDLAW, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
03Fang Zeng appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to vacate the court’s entry of default and default judgment against her under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).
04* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Frequently Asked Questions
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2023 MOLLY C.
FlawCheck shows no negative treatment for Anqin Wang v. Fang Zeng in the current circuit citation data.
This case was decided on December 11, 2023.
Use the citation No. 9450960 and verify it against the official reporter before filing.