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No. 10584059
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Alvarenga-Rodriguez v. Bondi
No. 10584059 · Decided May 14, 2025
No. 10584059·Ninth Circuit · 2025·
FlawFinder last updated this page Apr. 2, 2026
Case Details
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided
May 14, 2025
Citation
No. 10584059
Disposition
See opinion text.
Full Opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 14 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETROCINIO ALVARENGA- No. 23-2918
RODRIGUEZ, Agency No. A088-721-732
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 12, 2025**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, W. FLETCHER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Petrocinio Alvarenga-Rodriguez petitions for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his motion to reopen. He moved
to reopen his proceedings to apply for cancellation of removal. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.
Cui v. Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2021). Alvarenga-Rodriguez contends
that the BIA abused its discretion when it declined to equitably toll his untimely
motion to reopen. But even if he prevailed on the issue of equitable tolling, that
would not necessarily result in a favorable decision. The BIA also denied
Alvarenga-Rodriguez’s motion to reopen on two “independent grounds”: (1)
“failure to establish a prima facie case for” cancellation of removal; and (2) failure
to show he would be entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion for cancellation
of removal. Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010)).
“[P]rima facie eligibility for relief requires only a threshold showing of
eligibility—a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail on the merits
if the motion to reopen were granted.” Id. at 1179. To be eligible for cancellation
of removal, Alvarenga-Rodriguez must, among other criteria, “‘establis[h] that
removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his]
spouse, parent, or child,’ who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.”
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 213 (2024) (second alteration in original)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)). The BIA concluded that Alvarenga-
Rodriguez had not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on his
cancellation of removal application because he had “not identified and documented
2
heightened hardship” to his U.S. citizen children “beyond that which would
normally be expected to occur.” That is, Alvarenga-Rodriguez did not show his
removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his
children. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen on
the prima facie eligibility ground.
Further, if a movant seeks relief that requires a favorable exercise of
discretion, he must meet the “would likely change” standard by “establish[ing] that
it is at least more probable than not that the new evidence would change the
outcome of the claim.” Fonseca-Fonseca, 76 F.4th at 1183. The BIA
independently denied Alvarenga-Rodriguez’s motion to reopen because he had not
sufficiently addressed whether he would deserve a favorable exercise of discretion,
“such that a different outcome would be likely.” The BIA applied the correct
“would likely change” standard. See id. It permissibly put the burden on
Alvarenga-Rodriguez to satisfy that standard given that “a moving party must
show that he warrants the relief sought as a matter of discretion.” Matter of
Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 472 (BIA 1992); see also Matter of Chen, 28 I. & N.
Dec. 676, 682 (BIA 2023). In his motion to reopen, Alvarenga-Rodriguez did not
address or attempt to diminish the force of a significant negative factor that
weighed against a favorable exercise of discretion. BIA therefore did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motion to reopen on this discretionary ground.
3
PETITION DENIED.
4
Plain English Summary
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 14 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C.
Key Points
01FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 14 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C.
02COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PETROCINIO ALVARENGA- No.
03On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 12, 2025** San Francisco, California Before: S.R.
04Petitioner Petrocinio Alvarenga-Rodriguez petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his motion to reopen.
Frequently Asked Questions
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 14 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C.
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This case was decided on May 14, 2025.
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